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ABSTRACT
A surprising amount of everyday expression is, strictly speaking,
nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether
or why such meaningless speech falls within “the freedom of speech.”
If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and
expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is
complicated. And because nonsense is widespread, the case is also
important—artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the
only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the
outcome.
This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship
between nonsense and the freedom of speech; in doing so, it suggests
ways to determine what “meaning” means for First Amendment
purposes. The Article begins by demonstrating the scope and
constitutional salience of meaningless speech, showing that nonsense
is multifarious, widespread, and sometimes intertwined with
traditional First Amendment values like the marketplace of ideas,
autonomy, and democracy. The second part of the Article argues that
exploring nonsense can illuminate the meaning of meaning itself.
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This, too, is an important task, for although free speech discourse
often relies on the concept of meaning to chart the Amendment’s
scope, courts and scholars have done relatively little to establish what
it entails. Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have spent much of the
past century doing little else. Their efforts—echoes of which can
already be heard in First Amendment doctrine—suggest that free
speech doctrine is best served by finding meaning in the way words
are used, rather than in the degree to which they represent
extralinguistic concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose approach to meaning and language
1
changed the course of modern philosophy, once wrote: “Don’t for
heavens sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay
2
attention to your nonsense.” His exhortation is especially salient for
1. See Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L.
REV. 937, 938 (1990) (“It is the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein which is central to modern
philosophy’s turn to language. For Wittgenstein, all philosophical problems are ultimately
problems of language.”).
2. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 56e (G.H. von Wright ed., Peter
Winch trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1980) (1977); see also Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian &
Oskari Kuusela, Introduction to WITTGENSTEIN AND HIS INTERPRETERS 32 n.23 (Guy Kahane,
Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela eds., 2007) (“Saul Liberman . . . reportedly once
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those interested in the scope of the First Amendment, because courts
and scholars have often suggested that the Amendment’s terrain is
3
defined by meaning, without doing much to show what meaning (or
its absence, nonsense) actually means. As a result, the concept of
meaning operates like a rogue boundary surveyor, erratically charting
the First Amendment’s territory without judicial or scholarly
accountability.
This raises a variety of interesting and difficult questions. If
meaning establishes the boundaries of the First Amendment, then
what are we to make of nonsense—“words or language having no
4
meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”? If the Supreme Court is
right that the Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
5
about of political and social changes desired by the people,’” then
6
speech lacking such ideas—assuming that it is actually “speech” —
7
would not seem to merit constitutional coverage at all. That would be
introduced a 1940s lecture by the famous Kabbalah scholar Gershom Scholem with the words
‘Nonsense is nonsense—but the history of nonsense is scholarship.’”).
3. See, e.g., John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2008)
(“Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or
‘information.’”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973) (“The crucial question under the first amendment
is simply whether meaningful symbols of any type are being employed by one who wishes to
communicate to others.”); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of
“Speech,” 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1559 (“[T]he first requirement for communication by conduct
is that the conduct be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an
extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use sounds to
communicate unless the sounds have some meaning attached to them.”).
4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791 (10th ed. 1996); see also
William Charlton, Nonsense, 17 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 346, 346 (1977) (“The notion of nonsense
has been freely used by philosophers of this century, but no full or satisfactory account has been
given of it. . . . The English word ‘nonsense’ seems to apply most appropriately to something
which purports to have a sense or meaning, but does not in fact have one.”).
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (emphasis added) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship.”).
6. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 273 (1981) (“[T]he constitutional definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out
a category that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”). I
revisit this assumption below at notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
7. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606
(“Speech that is not intended to communicate a substantive message or that is directed solely to
noncognitive capacities may be wholly or largely without the properties that give speech its
special status.”). My goal is to investigate whether nonsense falls within the First Amendment—
a question of coverage—not to establish the level of protection it should receive. See Frederick
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a jarring conclusion indeed, which might explain why even those who
treat meaning as an essential ingredient of speech tend to avoid it.
This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of nonrepresentational
art such as Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings and Lewis Carroll’s
nonsense verse. The Supreme Court has reassuringly declared these
8
to be “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. But far
from being unquestionable, their shielding in fact raises questions that
are, as Mark Tushnet generously puts it, “quite difficult to answer
9
satisfactorily.”
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the difficulty of these
questions is not the only cause for concern, and that artists—though
10
they seem to have a special relationship with nonsense —are not the
only would-be speakers who should be keenly interested in the
answers. This is true even if we focus exclusively on linguistic
communication, which by many accounts is presumptively entitled to
11
First Amendment coverage. Sometimes we speak without intending

Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of the First
Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues
surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech to which it
applies.”).
8. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (“As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam))).
9. Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170 (2012).
10. See id. at 169 (providing examples of artists denying the necessity of traditional
meaning in their work, including Archibald MacLeish’s claim that “[a] poem should not mean
but be,” ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, Ars Poetica, in COLLECTED POEMS 1917–1982, at 106, 107
(1985), and William Carlos Williams’s refrain, “No ideas but in things,” 2 WILLIAM CARLOS
WILLIAMS, A Sort of Song, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS 55
(Christopher MacGowan ed., New Directions Books 2001)); see also Amy M. Adler, Note, PostModern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1364 (1990) (noting that
postmodern art “not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be ‘serious,’ it rejected the
idea that art must have any traditional ‘value’ at all”); id. at 1367 (“[T]he 80’s has been the
decade in which art that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art around.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Elizabeth Frank, Art’s Off-the-Wall Critic, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Nov. 19, 1989, at 47, 78)).
11. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969)
(“‘[P]ure speech’ . . . , we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under
the First Amendment.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 192–99 (describing the attractions and perils
of “nominalism,” which would focus on “words and word equivalents” as the starting point of
First Amendment analysis). This Article focuses primarily on nonsensical language, rather than
nonsensical conduct, because it seems to be well-accepted that conduct can be nonsensical,
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to “mean” anything at all—exclamations, jokes, doggerel verse, and
12
even philosophical illustrations may all be nonsensical. As
Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through
13
them, on them, over them.” Other times, we are unaware of our own
nonsense, either because we wrongly believe our propositions to be
14
meaningful or because we are simply misunderstood. If meaning is a
prerequisite for constitutional coverage, and much of what we say is
meaningless without our ever knowing it, then the boundaries of the
First Amendment are not only narrow but also unknown.
15
Consider Morse v. Frederick, in which the Supreme Court
upheld the suspension of a high school student who had unfurled a
banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus school
16
function. The Court conceded that the banner’s purported message
“is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to
17
others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all,” but
concluded that the student’s suspension was “consistent with the First
Amendment” because the banner “was reasonably viewed as
18
promoting illegal drug use.” The student himself said, quite
plausibly, that “the words were just nonsense meant to attract
19
television cameras.” In dissent, Justice Stevens similarly concluded
whereas the connection between language and nonsense has been largely unexplored. As noted
in the Conclusion, the use-meaning approach would not extend First Amendment coverage to
all linguistic communication.
12. See Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“It would normally be thought fairly damning to say
of an utterance or a piece of writing ‘That is nonsense.’ Yet men of undoubted intelligence, like
Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll, have devoted time and pains to writing what they admit is
nonsense, and talking nonsense has been regarded as a conversational art.”). For a discussion of
overt nonsense, see infra Part I.A.1.
13. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 6.54, at 189 (C.K.
Ogden ed. & trans., 1922). Whether this is really what he intended (and whether he succeeded)
is of course another matter. The “meaning” of the Tractatus’s avowed lack of sense has been an
elusive and perhaps ephemeral grail for analytic philosophers. For a description of the debate
over “ineffable” and “resolute” readings, see Leo K.C. Cheung, The Disenchantment of
Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 31 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 197, 201–03
(2008), and infra notes 103–17.
14. For a discussion of covert nonsense, see infra Part I.A.2.
15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
16. Id. at 396–97.
17. Id. at 401.
18. Id. at 403, 409.
19. See id. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d,
551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
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that “[t]his is a nonsense message, not advocacy.” What if Stevens
had commanded the majority? Would the student’s comments be
unpunishable, or would they not count as speech at all?
Simply to describe the broad scope of nonsense both
demonstrates its importance and suggests that meaning is an
21
unreliable guide to the First Amendment’s hinterlands. Moreover,
meaning’s guidance would not necessarily be welcome even if it were
accurate, because much nonsensical speech rests solidly on the
normative foundations of the First Amendment—the values that the
22
doctrine is created to protect. Primary among these are the
marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and democratic
23
participation. Nonsense can and often does further each of them.
Part I thus sketches the terrain of nonsensical speech, and makes
a preliminary case for its protection. In doing so, it uncovers a
uniquely convenient entrance to the very depths of the First
Amendment, shining light on the idea of meaning itself. Spelunking in
this area is hazardous business, and Part II proceeds with caution.
Despite the difficulties, the exploration is worthwhile, for First
Amendment theory and doctrine often suggest that meaning is an
essential element of constitutionally salient speech without defining
20. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 435 (referring to the “nonsense
banner”).
21. I follow Robert Post’s lead by attempting to tell a story in which doctrine and
normative commitments are interdependent. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 5 (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY] (“To determine the
purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual shape of entrenched
First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free
Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Reply] (“Because law
typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those whom it seeks to
govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring into our historical
commitments and principles.” (footnote omitted) (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel,
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))).
22. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining
What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011) (“[T]he answer to
the question of what constitutes the freedom of speech depends on the conception one adopts,
and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely subjective preference than to a
conclusion reached by a series of falsifiable steps.”).
23. For a discussion of the constitutional value of nonsense, see infra Part I.B. “Expression
that is not intended to communicate anything may clearly promote the four values identified by
[Thomas] Emerson as underlying the first amendment.” Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on
Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 722 (1983). Emerson’s
fourth value focuses on “[w]hether, although the conduct may not in itself qualify for special
protection, such protection is necessary in order to safeguard other, qualified conduct.” Id. I
discuss this argument below at notes 163–69 and accompanying text.
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what meaning is or where it comes from. In other words, courts and
free speech scholars have not explained what meaning means.
Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have made meaning a
24
primary target. Throughout the past century (paralleling almost
25
exactly the lifespan of the modern First Amendment) they have
developed two general methods for charting the boundaries of what
can meaningfully be said. Their goal in doing so has been to find the
26
limits of language, thought, and the world, not to generate
constitutional doctrine. And yet the tools they have created—which
with egregious but necessary oversimplification can be called
“representational” meaning and “use” meaning—have been wielded,
sometimes awkwardly and perhaps unknowingly, by the Justices
27
themselves.
The representational approach finds meaning in the relationship
28
between expression and underlying concepts. Some version of this
basic idea underlies the logical positivism associated with thinkers
like Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein in his early writings, among
many others. Under the representational approach, speech that fails
to represent extralinguistic ideas is simply nonsense and, if meaning is
an essential ingredient of constitutionally salient speech, therefore
falls outside the realm of the First Amendment. As Russell once put
it, “Absorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the
connexion of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this
connexion that gives meaning to words and significance to
29
sentences.”

24. See B.R. Tilghman, Literature, Philosophy and Nonsense, 30 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 256,
256 (1990) (“[A] good case can be made that the notion of meaning and all it implies for the
distinction between sense and nonsense has been the primary concern of twentieth-century
philosophy, at least Anglo-American philosophy . . . .”).
25. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular, albeit “crude,” view is that “the First
Amendment started in 1919,” which was when Justice Holmes wrote his dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)).
26. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 5.6, at 149 (“The limits of my language mean the
limits of my world.”).
27. Borrowing philosophers’ tools, with or without acknowledgement, would itself be
nothing new for First Amendment doctrine. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative
Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 875–78 (1986) (tracing the
First Amendment doctrine’s “philosophical origins” to John Milton, John Locke, John Stuart
Mill, and others).
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. HERBERT HOCHBERG, Preface to INTRODUCING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS SENSE
AND ITS NONSENSE, 1879–2002 (2003) (quoting Russell).
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A representational approach to meaning apparently animates
many of the Supreme Court’s efforts to chart the boundaries of the
freedom of speech, from the oft-repeated aphorism that “[t]he First
Amendment . . . embodies ‘[o]ur profound national commitment to
30
the free exchange of ideas’” to the Spence test, which asks whether
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,” and
whether “the likelihood was great that the message would be
31
understood by those who viewed it.” The representational approach
is also implicitly employed by those who fret about the constitutional
32
protection of nonrepresentational art. Nonrepresentationalism, after
all, is only problematic for the First Amendment if representativeness
itself is constitutionally relevant.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the representational approach is
defective as a constitutional principle. Requiring speech acts to
represent ideas would exclude nearly all of the potentially valuable
nonsense described in Part I, including vast stretches of discourse
33
regarding ethics, aesthetics, and religion. On the representational
34
account, they simply “cannot be expressed,” and thus “the tendency
of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to
run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls
35
of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless.” Fortunately, the First
Amendment is not so limited; the boundaries of the freedom of
speech are not coextensive with the “walls of our cage.”

30. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)); see also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate
of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties . . . .” (alteration in
original) (quoting Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
31. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). In Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court suggested that the
message must be “created by the conduct itself,” not “by the speech that accompanies it.” Id. at
66.
32. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 3, at 35 (“It would be shocking to conclude that
symphonic compositions or nonrepresentational art could be the subject of governmental
censorship. Both are fully within the ambit of the first amendment notwithstanding their lack of
both verbal and cognitive content.”).
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.421, at 183.
35. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Ethics, Life and Faith, in THE WITTGENSTEIN READER 251,
258 (Anthony Kenny ed., 2d ed. 2006); see also James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral
Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 519 (1999) (discussing
this passage).
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In part to escape that cage, much of analytic philosophy took
36
what is known as the “linguistic turn.” That development, which is
closely associated with Wittgenstein’s later work, speech-act theory,
and ordinary-language philosophy, generally holds that “[t]he bounds
of sense, as it were, are all within language, and meaning is nowhere
other than in the many activities in which human beings use their
37
various languages.” As Wittgenstein explained, “For a large class of
cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it
can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
38
language.” Finding the boundaries of meaning, then, depends on
identifying the “language-games” that “consist[] of language and the
39
actions into which it is woven.”
Echoes of a use-meaning approach can already be found in First
Amendment discourse and doctrine. The use-meaning approach
explains the Court’s conclusion that constitutional coverage extends
to practices that form a “significant medium for the communication of
40
ideas,”
and is not “confined to expressions conveying a
41
‘particularized message.’” One can also find the influence of such an
approach in First Amendment scholarship, perhaps most prominently
and thoughtfully in Robert Post’s argument that First Amendment
values “do not attach to abstract acts of communication as such, but
rather to the social contexts that envelop and give constitutional
42
significance to acts of communication.”
36. See Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837,
1854–55 (1994) (“The legacy of philosophy from the middle of this century to the present has
been the systematic replacement of foundationalist epistemology with holism, the substitution
of referential theories of language with an emphasis on speech as action, and a general
movement away from the individual as the foundation of empirical, linguistic, and moral
judgment.” (footnotes omitted)).
37. Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–04
(1993) (book review); see also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 177
(1985) (“Conventionalism is a viewpoint, most closely associated with the later writings of
Wittgenstein, that emphasizes practice and context. It holds, for example, that we understand a
concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we can successfully use that concept within a
language game or a defined context, and that truth is a function of the agreement of those
participating within a practice rather than the other way around.” (footnote omitted)).
38. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1969) (1953).
39. Id. § 7.
40. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
41. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)).
42. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255
(1995); see also id. at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to articulate abstract characteristics of
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The use-meaning approach improves on the representational
approach both descriptively and normatively. It accounts for the
constitutional value in various forms of nonsense, captures the
contextual and socially embedded nature of language, and provides
better answers to thorny problems like the constitutional status of art.
Under the use-meaning approach, “Jabberwocky” is protected by the
First Amendment not because its words represent concepts, but
because it is recognizable as a poem. By contrast, those acts and
utterances that violate the rules of our language games simply do not
count as meaningful speech, even if they represent facts or concepts
and would therefore be meaningful under the representational
43
approach.
The Article thus concludes by endorsing the First Amendment’s
linguistic turn and its effort to find meaning in use, rather than in the
relationship of language to concepts. Making the most of such an
44
approach, however, is no simple task. As Professors Jack Balkin and
Sandy Levinson put it, language games “refuse clear-cut boundaries,
they borrow and steal from other sources, they overlap with other
language games, and their governing rules are always in a state of flux
and disputation. Lived language games are unruly and unkempt,
45
untamed and untidy, much as life itself is.” But if the First
Amendment’s boundaries depend on them, then such games must be
tamed. Doctrine must provide guidance; it must be able to identify
the First Amendment language games that create the kind of meaning
the Constitution requires. The use-meaning approach does not
provide easy answers to these problems, but it does provide a better
set of questions with which to address them.

speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of social order that are imbued with
constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways in which speech facilitates
that constitutional value.”). My goal here is, in part, to show that one potential “abstract
characteristic[] of speech”—meaning—is in fact derived from “discrete forms of social order.”
See id. at 1276–77.
43. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771–75
(2001) (considering the hypothetical First Amendment claims of a person who protests speed
limits by violating them).
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1802
(1994); see also WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 65 (“Instead of producing something common
to all that we call language, I am saying that [language games] have no one thing in common
which makes us use the same word for all,—but that they are related to one another in many
different ways.”).
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I. STUFF AND NONSENSE
Making sense of nonsense for First Amendment purposes
involves at least two tasks: establishing what nonsense is and
46
determining whether it has constitutional value. This Part attempts
to accomplish both, first sketching the landscape of meaningless
speech and then showing how that nonsense relates to the basic
values traditionally associated with the First Amendment. The
discussion therefore not only describes the scope and value of
nonsense, but also delivers a preliminary case for its constitutional
protection and opens the door for Part II’s exploration of the concept
of meaning itself.
Part I.A begins by describing nonsense’s broad domain.
Traditionally, it has been thought that boundary disputes between
meaning and nonsense are primarily relevant to the First Amendment
in the context of artistic expression, and that a capacious view of art
can more or less solve the problem. But nonsense contains
multitudes, and not all of its forms are easily recognizable as such.
The very breadth of nonsense demonstrates the importance of
explaining it, and also suggests that, unless the First Amendment has
been radically misunderstood, the Constitution covers at least some
of this meaningless speech.
As a matter of doctrine, however, it is not particularly satisfying
to say that nonsense must be protected by the Constitution because
there is so much of it. To merit coverage, nonsense must presumably
further the values traditionally associated with the First
47
Amendment, such as the marketplace of ideas, autonomy, and
democracy. Part I.B argues that nonsense does exactly that,
advancing the autonomous search for unsayable truths, contributing
to cognitive advancement despite lacking “meaning” of its own, and
even providing valuable outlets for political dissent. It follows that the
First Amendment must make room for nonsense, as Part II argues in
more detail.

46. One might also ask whether nonsense can be “speech,” but I will assume an affirmative
answer for now and return to that issue below. See infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text.
47. See POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment
doctrine cannot be explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the law’s
efforts to achieve constitutional values.”).
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A. The Definition and Scope of Nonsense
Whatever else it suggests, Wittgenstein’s admonition to “pay
48
attention to your nonsense” was a call to recognize nonsense when it
arises. That is a difficult but rewarding task, for nonsense takes many
49
forms. Because the goal of this discussion is to have constitutional
reasoning drive conceptual analysis rather than the other way around,
this Section evaluates the scope and constitutional value of nonsense
in general terms before elaborating a more rigorous definition of
meaning in Part II. The downside of this approach is that it is, as an
initial matter, overexpansive: Pollock’s paintings, for example, are
usually seen as nonrepresentational and therefore qualify as a certain
kind of nonsense, despite their undoubted value and First
Amendment protection. Indeed, the point of the following discussion
is to develop an appropriate definition of meaning based on an
understanding of what it would exclude. And at least as an initial
matter, it is not enough to simply posit that meaning is different from
propositional content, for much First Amendment scholarship and
50
doctrine makes precisely that connection.
In an effort to impose some order, the following discussion
divides nonsense—“[w]ords or language having no meaning or
51
52
intelligible ideas” —into two major categories: overt and covert.

48. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 56e.
49. See Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“In general philosophers have gone wrong in
supposing that whatever is nonsensical is nonsensical in the same way.”).
50. See infra notes 170–72, 205–17 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Nonsense, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nonsense (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (defining
“nonsense” as “spoken or written words that have no meaning or make no sense”).
52. It would be perfectly plausible to slice nonsense in other ways, however—between
purposeful and accidental, substantial and mere, illuminating and misleading, and so on. Oskari
Kuusela, Nonsense and Clarification in the Tractatus—Resolute and Ineffability Readings and the
Tractatus’ Failure, 80 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA 35, 37 (2006) (distinguishing “between
misleading and illuminating nonsense” by noting that “[t]he former is unself-conscious nonsense
attempting to say what can only be shown,” whereas “[t]he latter is self-conscious nonsense
intended to reveal its own nonsensicalness”).
The two approaches to meaning discussed in Part II also suggest their own definitions
of nonsense; indeed, the Article concludes by arguing that “representational” nonsense is
constitutionally protected, whereas “use” nonsense is not. Because that argument is dependent
in part on the fact that the former would include—and therefore exclude from constitutional
coverage—so much everyday nonsense, it is better to start with a more general definition of
nonsense.
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1. Overt Nonsense. At almost the same time that Russell and
Wittgenstein were busy in Cambridge trying to pin down nonsense,
Carroll was busy in Oxford generating more of it. “Jabberwocky,”
perhaps his most famous piece of nonsense verse (and a cameo
53
performer in First Amendment doctrine ), begins: “’Twas brillig, and
the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wade; / All mimsy were
54
the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe.” As far as the
55
average reader can tell, these are symbols with no references;
56
“sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing.” As such, they are overt
57
nonsense.
Neither the speaker nor the hearer of overt nonsense believes it
to have meaning. Its lack of meaning is thus both intentional and
58
apparent. Some overt nonsense is fanciful, in that it does not purport
to convey meaning, but rather is designed to create a sense of
amusement or delight in the listener. People seem to enjoy such
nonsense for the same reasons that babies gurgle at a novel
stimulus—it provides a sense of wonder, possibility, and absurdity.
But overt nonsense need not have some instrumental reason for
59
existence; it can simply be nonsense for nonsense’s sake.
Much artistic expression is overtly and sometimes avowedly
nonsensical. In his thoughtful analysis of nonrepresentational art,
Tushnet points out that many artists—from Archibald MacLeish to
53. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995). “Jabberwocky” is perhaps the most famous of Carroll’s nonsense, but it is by no
means the only example. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
134 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1869) (1865) (“Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than
what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.”).
54. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
21 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1872).
55. Carroll and Humpty Dumpty—his avatar of nonsense—later provided a glossary of
terms. See infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
56. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
57. See Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37 (describing Peter Hacker’s view of overt nonsense);
see also P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
WITTGENSTEIN 18–19 (rev. ed. 1986) (distinguishing overt and covert nonsense).
58. William Charlton refers to something like this when he discusses “factual” nonsense:
“An utterance is factual nonsense if a person uttering it cannot mean what he says without
ignoring plain facts, or what are taken to be plain facts.” See Charlton, supra note 4, at 352
(distinguishing “factual” from “grammatical” and “logical” nonsense).
59. See id. at 355 (“A man could not, of course, compose what he knows is nonsense
without having a purpose of some sort. But he need have no ulterior purpose, no reason for
writing what he writes except that it is nonsense. Lear and Carroll, at least, seem to have written
nonsense for its own sake in this way.”).
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William Carlos Williams—have denied the need for, or the
desirability of, a direct connection between art and traditional
60
61
meaning. As Williams put it, “A poem should not mean but be.”
Charles Rosen makes a similar point in the context of literary style:
We should recall here the extraordinary sixteenth-century
controversy about style between the admirers of Cicero and of
Erasmus, the former, led by Étienne Dolet, believing that style had a
beauty independent of the matter of the literary work, and the latter
insisting that the beauty of style was wholly dependent on its
62
consonance with meaning.

Of course, one need not look that far to find examples of art that
overtly lacks representational meaning. Consider the lyrics of popular
63
64
songs, from “I Am the Walrus” to “Who Put the Bomp” to “Louie
65
66
Louie” to those consisting entirely of gibberish.
The relationship between overt nonsense and art is not
monogamous, however. Philosophers and linguists frequently rely on
67
overt nonsense as an analytic instrument. The Tractatus, for
68
example, openly proclaims itself to lack meaning. Philosophers A.W.

60. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 169.
61. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 55.
62. CHARLES ROSEN, Freedom and Art, in FREEDOM AND THE ARTS: ESSAYS ON MUSIC
AND LITERATURE 8–9 (2012).
63. See THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records
1967) (“Semolina pilchards climbing up the Eiffel Tower / Elementary penguin singing Hare
Krishna / Man you should have seen them / Kicking Edgar Allen Poe”); see also THE BEATLES,
Come Together, on ABBEY ROAD (Capitol Records 1969) (“He bag production / He got walrus
gumboot / He got Ono sideboard / He one spinal cracker”).
64. Barry Mann & Gerry Goffin, Who Put the Bomp, on BARRY MANN, WHO PUT THE
BOMP (ABC-Paramount 1961) (“When my baby heard / ‘Bomp bah bah bomp’ / ‘Bah bomp
bah bomp bah’ / Every word went right into her heart.”).
65. THE KINGSMEN, Louie, Louie, on THE KINGSMEN IN PERSON (Wand Records 1963);
see also Eric Predoehl, A Short History of Louie Louie, LOUIELOUIE.NET (1999),
http://www.louielouie.net/06-history.htm (noting that the inscrutable song has “been called
everything from a musical joke, pure garbage, the dumbest song ever written, to the
quintessential pop single,” and that the FBI actually investigated the lyrics to determine
whether they are obscene).
66. ADRIANO CELENTANO, Prisencolinensinainciusol, on NOSTALROCK (Italdisc 1973)
(consisting of “lyrics” that mimic what American English sounds like to an Italian-speaking
listener).
67. Cf. Charlton, supra note 4, at 347 (“Unless they wish to illustrate a philosophic point
people seldom compose total nonsense on purpose.”).
68. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.54, at 189 (“My propositions are elucidatory in
this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless . . . .”). Wittgenstein’s use
of the word “senseless” rather than “nonsense” is significant, because he posited a difference

BLOCHER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/16/2014 8:10 PM

NONSENSE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1437

Moore and Peter Sullivan explain that Wittgenstein had no choice but
to use nonsense to demonstrate the boundaries of meaning itself:
The Tractatus consists mostly of nonsense because what
Wittgenstein is trying to convey, about language and its limits, is, by
its own lights, ineffable. The only way in which he can convey it—
the only way in which he can get the reader to ‘see the world
aright’—is by dint of a special kind of nonsense: what we might call
69
‘illuminating’ nonsense.

Unsurprisingly, many linguists have taken a similar approach. In
his dissertation, for example, Noam Chomsky set out to demonstrate
among other things that a sentence can be grammatically correct and
yet lack semantic meaning. His famous example was the phrase
70
“[c]olorless green ideas sleep furiously.”
2. Covert Nonsense. Whereas the meaninglessness of overt
71
nonsense is self-conscious and apparent to speaker and hearer alike,
covert nonsense is potentially more insidious. It arises when speakers
or hearers (or both) incorrectly believe that they are successfully
exchanging meaningful ideas.
Perhaps the most common type of covert nonsense is the
straightforward misunderstanding, in which speaker and hearer
disagree about the specific meaning of a particular speech act, or even
about whether the purported speech act has meaning at all. This
Section does not attempt to fully address the relationship between
misunderstandings and the freedom of speech—an interesting issue in
between the two. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, there is no need to make
such a fine distinction: both “senseless” and “nonsense” involve a lack of meaning. See Anat
Biletzki & Anat Matar, Ludwig Wittgenstein, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Dec. 23, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Wittgenstein (“The characteristic of being
senseless applies not only to the propositions of logic but also to other things that cannot be
represented, such as mathematics or the pictorial form itself of the pictures that do represent.
These are, like tautologies and contradictions, literally sense-less, they have no sense. Beyond,
or aside from, senseless propositions Wittgenstein identifies another group of statements which
cannot carry sense: the nonsensical (unsinnig) propositions. Nonsense, as opposed to
senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more radically devoid of meaning,
when it transcends the bounds of sense.”).
69. A.W. Moore & Peter Sullivan, Ineffability and Nonsense, 77 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y (SUPP.) 169, 179 (2003). As Wittgenstein explained, the aim of the Tractatus was to “draw
a limit to thinking,” which “can . . . only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of
the limit will be simply nonsense.” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27.
70. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1957). I am indebted to David Blocher
for the example.
71. Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37.
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its own right—but rather tries to identify the particular problems that
misunderstandings pose for meaning-dependent approaches to the
First Amendment.
Simple misunderstandings occur when the speaker intends one
meaning and the listener hears another. Such situations are, of course,
extremely common, but some approaches to the definition of
72
speech—taken at face value—might exclude them. Carroll’s poetry
and Pollock’s paintings are “unquestionably shielded” by the First
73
Amendment, but one might reasonably ask whether many people
“understand” them. For that matter, one could ask the same of
Finnegan’s Wake, Matthew Barney’s movies, or any number of other
impenetrable artistic works. So, too, are few listeners able to
understand the specific meanings of most scientific, scholarly, or even
legal speech. And it would be troubling, to say the least, if discussions
of the Rule Against Perpetuities or the Higgs boson—or professors’
efforts to teach them—lack First Amendment protection simply
because so few people comprehend them.
But misunderstandings can be more complicated. In addition to
disagreeing about what meaning is conveyed by a purported speech
act, people sometimes disagree about whether the act is meaningful at
all. Such deep misunderstandings arise in at least two ways, which can
with some oversimplification be called “lost meaning” and “found
meaning.” The former occurs when a speaker intends to convey
meaning and the listener fails to recognize not only the specific
meaning, but also the nature of the act as meaningful. In other words,
the listener does not even perceive the purported speech act as an
effort to communicate meaning. Consider a computer programmer
who expresses herself in code. A nonprogrammer might not only fail

72. Cf., e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[The Court] cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”); Nimmer, supra note 3, at
37 (concluding that “symbolic speech requires not merely that given conduct results in a
meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must intend such a meaning effect by his
conduct”). To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these authorities would actually exclude
misunderstandings from the First Amendment, only that their approaches seem to do so, as
stated. Nimmer, for example, not only posited that a “meaning effect” was necessary for
symbolic speech, but also that the Amendment covered speech lacking “both verbal and
cognitive content.” Id. at 35–36.
73. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
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to understand the code’s specific meaning, but also fail to understand
74
that it contains meaning at all.
Found meaning, by contrast, arises when a listener imputes
meaning to an act when the putative speaker never meant to convey
any. First Amendment theory and doctrine have not focused
extensively on the possibility of found meaning, but interesting
hypotheticals easily come to mind. Imagine, for example, that a
person sees a famous pianist sitting on a bench at her piano. The
performer is simply taking a break, thinking about a recent vacation.
The starstruck and credulous viewer, however, imagines that she is
trying out a new performance of John Cage’s 4’33”, which consists of
75
four and a half minutes of not playing. The viewer has discovered
meaning and imputed it to the daydreaming pianist, but no volitional
speech has occurred. One could even stipulate that the person on the
bench is not a pianist at all, but a janitor resting after her shift. Or
imagine a traveler strolling in a foreign country, singing the
supposedly nonsensical words of his favorite Beatles song. Little does
76
he know that in the country he is visiting, “semolina pilchards” is a
grievous and actionable insult. Is the janitor or the tourist “speaking”
for First Amendment purposes, notwithstanding the fact that neither
intends to communicate any meaning?
First Amendment theory and doctrine do not provide satisfying
answers as to whether such unintentional speech is constitutionally
77
covered. Denying constitutional coverage to unintended speech
could leave out a wide range of speakers who cannot control their
speech acts—those who are coerced or asleep, for example. A person

74. Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Communication does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is
expressed in the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores are
written in ‘code,’ i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet both are
covered by the First Amendment.”).
75. JOHN CAGE, 4’33” (1952); see MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC: CAGE AND
BEYOND 11 (2d ed. 1999) (“[The piece’s] first and most famous performance was given by a
pianist (David Tudor) . . . . Tudor, seated in the normal fashion on a stool in front of the piano,
did nothing more nor less than silently close the keyboard lid at the beginning of, and raise it at
the end of each time period.”).
76. See THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records
1967).
77. Most likely, neither the pianist, janitor, nor tourist could raise First Amendment claims,
given the requirement in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S 405 (1974), of “intent to convey a
particularized message.” Id. at 410–11. In Mental States and Constitutional Rights (work in
progress), I consider in some detail whether constitutional rights do or should have act and
mental state requirements analogous to those found in tort and criminal law.
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with Tourette Syndrome may have involuntary verbal tics that can
include a wide variety of “vocalizations,” from “grunting, throat
clearing, shouting and barking” to “socially inappropriate words and
78
phrases.” If such a person were to involuntarily utter an actionable
threat or libel, shouldn’t she be able to raise the First Amendment as
a defense? On the one hand, Tushnet persuasively suggests that a
“‘reasonable’ imputation of meaning to otherwise meaningless
words—or symbols—is sufficient to trigger First Amendment
79
coverage.” On the other hand, treating involuntary acts as
meaningful speech implies that the people who “spoke” them can be
held responsible for meaning they never intended to convey.
Transforming their nonsense into speech will not always work to their
80
advantage, as the student in Morse v. Frederick learned.
Finally, covert nonsense can arise when both speaker and hearer
incorrectly believe that they have communicated meaningful ideas.
Even though the parties think they are engaged in communication,
81
their words actually lack meaning. This sounds far-fetched, but
according to some accounts of meaning it happens more often than
we might like to think. To a representationalist, for example,
language is meaningful only when it refers to some extralinguistic
82
fact, and a great deal of everyday speech fails this test. Wittgenstein
himself believed, at least in his early writing, that aesthetics, ethics,
83
and theology “cannot be expressed,” and are therefore nonsensical.
78. What Is Tourette Syndrome?, NAT’L TOURETTE SYNDROME ASS’N, http://www.tsausa.org/aMedical/whatists.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
79. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 198; see also id. at 215 (“Taken together with Hurley and
Cohen, Humanitarian Law Project implies that any activity that enough people regard as having
some meaning, noncognitive as well as cognitive, must survive the highest level of scrutiny . . . .”
(citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971))).
80. See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
81. Cf. Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37 (“[W]e can draw a . . . distinction between misleading
and illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own
nonsensicalness.”).
82. For a description of the representational approach, see infra Part II.A.
83. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, §§ 6.42–6.421, at 183 (“Hence also there can be no
ethical propositions. . . . [E]thics cannot be expressed.”); see also id. § 4.003, at 63 (“Most
propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false,
but senseless.”); Gregory S. Kavka, Wittgensteinian Political Theory, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1455,
1458 n.7 (1974) (reviewing HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1972))
(“Since . . . Wittgenstein holds that propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and religion are not
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But of course they are also enormously significant—many people
regard such matters as the very lifeblood of public discourse.
The idea of covert nonsense is somewhat unsettling; its apparent
scope is downright disturbing. If much of what we say is nonsensical
without our even realizing it, then the boundaries of the First
Amendment are not only narrow but unknown. Any time we fail to
give meaning to our propositions, despite our best efforts and despite
believing that we have done so, we are operating outside of
constitutional coverage.
B. The Constitutional Value of Nonsense
Simply describing the broad scope of nonsense demonstrates that
the representational-meaning approach provides a poor map of the
First Amendment’s actual boundaries. That is, the Constitution
undoubtedly does cover much of the nonsensical speech discussed in
the previous Section, notwithstanding its lack of representational
content. And there must be some reason for this; it is unsatisfying to
say that nonsense should be protected by the First Amendment
simply because it is plentiful. Appealing as that conclusion might be,
it is normatively defensible only if nonsense serves relevant
constitutional values such as the marketplace of ideas, individual
84
autonomy, and democracy. The following discussion attempts to
show that nonsense is in fact an important means of furthering each
of those values.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas. The model of the marketplace of
85
86
ideas—the first and perhaps still most prominent First Amendment
amenable to such analysis, he concludes that such propositions lack cognitive significance. This
does not mean that Wittgenstein regards the propositions of aesthetics, ethics, and religion as
worthless—such propositions are strictly speaking nonsensical, yet they possess a kind of
mystical significance for they try to express that which is important but linguistically
inexpressible.” (citation omitted)).
84. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only free speech principles, nor that we
must choose only one of them. Cf. Post, supra note 42, at 1271 (“There is in fact no general free
speech principle . . . .”).
85. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000).
86. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test” but that “[t]here
is no other”); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821,
823–25 (2008) (“This [marketplace of ideas] theory provided the first justification for a broad
freedom of expression commensurate with the sweeping language of the First Amendment
itself.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
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theory—rests on the notion that, if left unregulated, good ideas will
eventually win out over bad ones. In American law, the theory is
traced to Justice Holmes’s argument that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
87
market.” Importantly, the truths that the marketplace can
supposedly uncover are not narrowly defined, and can include
88
political and ethical insights as well as empirical facts. As Justice
Brandeis put it in his own statement of the marketplace rationale,
“[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
89
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”
Inasmuch as nonsense represents a disconnect between words
90
and ideas, it seems out of place in a marketplace devoted exclusively
to the latter—especially when ideas are valuable only as handmaidens
91
to truth. This is particularly apparent under some conceptions of
“truth” itself. Just as some analytic approaches find meaning in the
92
relationship between language and extralinguistic facts, so too does
the correspondence theory of truth hold that statements are true
93
when they represent “actual” extralinguistic facts. As Russell

Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oftrepeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”).
87. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45
(H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”).
88. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“These test-related distinctions reflect the constitutional importance of maintaining a free
marketplace of ideas, a marketplace that provides access to ‘social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))).
89. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
90. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 791 (defining
“nonsense” as “words or language having no meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”).
91. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the
Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 241 (“The [marketplace] theory’s
emphasis on ideas, however, is troubling, and has the potential for making the first amendment
value of art derivative. To the extent that the concept of ideas refers to intellectual and
cognitive processes, it does not take account of the noncognitive and emotional aspects of
communication which often accompany artistic expression, especially of the
nonrepresentational kind.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 205 (“What ‘idea’ does Jackson Pollock’s
Blue Poles: No.11 convey? Even more, what idea does Ulysses convey?”); cf. Brandt v. Bd. of
Educ., 480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Self expression is not to be equated to the expression
of ideas or opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace.”).
92. See infra Part II.A.
93. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 84 (Arc Manor 2008)
(1912).
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explained, “[A] belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and
94
is false when there is no corresponding fact.” A statement that does
not correspond to a fact therefore seems meaningless under a formal
approach to meaning, and false under a correspondence theory of
truth. If meaningless statements do not even refer to extralinguistic
facts, how can they possibly promote the intellectual search for those
facts?
But such an argument unfairly oversimplifies both the normative
vision of the marketplace model and the potential cognitive value of
nonsense. As to the former, even the harshest critics of the
marketplace model do not envision it being animated solely by a
correspondence theory of truth. Under the marketplace approach, the
value of free speech extends beyond the accurate identification of
facts. Instead, the vision seems to be of what is called a “coherence”
theory of truth, one that identifies as true that which people, through
95
open discussion, come to regard as such. The First Amendment
generally shies away from legally enforceable determinations about
what is “really” true, at least with regard to speech in public
96
discourse.
Even if one thinks that the First Amendment is concerned only
with the conveyance of true facts, it is apparent that doctrine
embodies a kind of “epistemological humility” on the part of
97
government. The reasons for this are easy enough to perceive, and
they suggest that nonsense may be entitled to protection under a
marketplace theory. One such reason is a general distrust of

94. Id. at 85.
95. See Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157, 167 (1980) (noting that, under the modern analytic approach, “there is no simple or certain
way to know the meanings of words and sentences; even their ‘truth’ depends on the game in
which they are used”). There is of course a danger of tautology here, one that reemerges in
efforts to define as “speech” that which people recognize as such. Cf. Post, supra note 85, at
2366 (“In the absence of such a morality [of public debate], it is merely tautological to presume
that truth is what most people come to believe after open discussion.”).
96. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339
(1974))). As Post notes, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.” POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 29 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340);
see id. at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the distinction can be explained based on whether the
purportedly false statements are part of public discourse); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120
Stat. 3266 (2006), which criminalized lies about certain military medals).
97. Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican
Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 271 (1991).
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government officials determining the meaning of private speech.
That is, if the marketplace model requires judges to be agnostic as to
truthfulness, it seems that they should also be agnostic as to
meaningfulness.
Some version of this concern has arisen in the context of art, with
many judges and scholars arguing that judges are not well-suited to
determine art’s meaning, value, or even existence. As Justice Holmes
once put it, judging the value of art is a “dangerous undertaking for
99
persons trained only to the law.” If we do not trust judges to identify
which of many possible meanings a work of art conveys, why would
we trust them to identify whether it conveys meaning at all? Imbuing
meaning where none is intended can distort speech just as much as
other forms of misunderstanding. Consider again Carroll’s verse.
Some believe “Jabberwocky” to be overtly nonsensical, as suggested
100
above. Others suggest, to the contrary, that the poem represents not

98. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
2 (1989) (“Not only the first amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of freedom of
speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers.”); see also Vincent Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985)
(theorizing that in interpreting the First Amendment courts’ “overriding objective at all times
should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and
most likely to stifle dissent systematically”).
99. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Miller v.
Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring)
(“[A First Amendment claim regarding nude dancing] strikes judges as ridiculous in part
because most of us are either middle-aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be snooty
about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have a natural tendency to think
political expression more important than artistic expression, in part because we are
Americans—which means that we have been raised in a culture in which puritanism,
philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and often incongruously interwoven—and in part
because like all lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down that the words in statutes and
the Constitution mean what they say, and a striptease is not speech.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
The question has also proven difficult for persons not “trained only to the law,” as
Jeremy Waldron points out: “What [art critics] find is that they cannot agree about the
definition of ‘art.’” Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 530–31 (1994).
100. See Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through
Pseudocommunication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (“Jabberwocky has no meaning, at least
that an adult audience could discern.”). Indeed, the word “Jabberwocky” has come to be used
as a synonym for mere nonsense. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual
Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1478 (2010) (“The artistic solution, in effect, is the
expression, or vehicle, for the themes, meaning, and emotion essential to the found artistic
problem. Without it, artistic expression becomes nothing more than Jabberwocky.”).
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nonsense, but a purposeful and illustrative distortion of sense. Who
are judges to determine which of these is the better interpretation of
Carroll?
Nonsense—overt and otherwise—can also be a useful, perhaps
102
even essential, tool in illuminating certain kinds of truth. Consider
again (and again and again) the Tractatus. What is the truth value of a
book that proclaims itself to be nonsensical? That question has
103
bedeviled and divided philosophers for the better part of a century,
and although no clear victor has emerged, their efforts demonstrate
that nonsense can play a unique and important role in the intellectual
marketplace.
The battle lines of the Tractarian debate are currently drawn
between what have been called the “ineffable” and the “resolute”
readings. The former, represented prominently by Russell and Peter
Hacker, holds that “there are, according to the author of the
104
Tractatus, ineffable truths that can be apprehended.” As Russell put
it in his introduction to the Tractatus, “[A]fter all, Mr [sic]
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said,
thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly there may be
some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other
105
exit.” And as Hacker points out, “That there are things that cannot
be put into words, but which make themselves manifest is a leitmotif

101. See generally, e.g., Peter J. Lucas, From Jabberwocky Back to Old English: Nonsense,
Anglo-Saxon and Oxford, in 1 LANGUAGE HISTORY AND LINGUISTIC MODELLING 503
(Raymond Hickey & Stainsław Puppel eds., 1997).
102. See Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37.
103. See Biletzki & Matar, supra note 68 (“‘Nonsense’ has become the hinge of
Wittgensteinian interpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20th century. Beyond the
bounds of language lies nonsense—propositions which cannot picture anything—and
Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that area. The quandary arises concerning the
question of what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense, since Wittgenstein does seem to be
saying that there is something there to be shown (rather than said) and does, indeed,
characterize it as the ‘mystical.’”).
104. P.M.S. Hacker, Was He Trying To Whistle It?, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 353, 368
(Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000). The reference in Hacker’s title is to a remark by
Wittgenstein’s friend, the Cambridge mathematician Frank Ramsey, who wrote that if
Wittgenstein was right, “we must then take seriously that [philosophy] is nonsense, and not
pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense!” FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 263 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931). Connecting the famous
final line of the Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s well-known habit, Ramsey wrote, “But what we
can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.” Id. at 238.
105. See Bertrand Russell, Introduction to WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 7, 22
(referencing the seventh and final section of the Tractatus).
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running through the whole of the Tractatus.” According to the
ineffable reading, Wittgenstein’s goal was to help us see these things
107
“aright,” and then to discard the apparatus that helped us to do so.
The book itself is overt nonsense (or at least aims to be, for those who
understand it) but still manages to convey meaning.
The “resolute,” or “austere,” reading, most closely associated
108
with James Conant and Cora Diamond, rejects the notion that there
109
are unsayable truths, or different kinds of nonsense. According to
this reading, “[I]t is a mistake to think that there is anything
informative about nonsense. Nonsense is nonsense and to think of the
Tractatus as showing some ‘essential feature of reality, which reality
has all right, but which we cannot say or think it has,’ is to make
110
Wittgenstein ‘chicken out.’” The purpose of the Tractatus is
111
therefore therapeutic, rather than demonstrative. It seeks to cure us
106. Hacker, supra note 104, at 353 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (citing
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.522, at 187); see also G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 162 (4th ed. 1971) (drawing this same
conclusion); Roy Brand, Making Sense Speaking Nonsense, 35 PHIL. F. 311, 313 (2004) (same).
The ineffable reading appears to be a matter of precedent in the Second Circuit. See Bery v.
City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ideas and concepts embodied in visual
art have the power to transcend . . . language limitations and reach beyond a particular language
group to both the educated and the illiterate.”).
107. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.54, at 189 (“My propositions are elucidatory in
this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has
climbed up on it.)”).
108. See generally, e.g., James Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early
Wittgenstein, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 104, at 174 [hereinafter Conant,
Elucidation and Nonsense]; James Conant, Must We Show What We Cannot Say?, in THE
SENSES OF STANLEY CAVELL 242 (Richard Fleming & Michael Payne eds., 1989); James
Conant, Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap and Early Wittgenstein,
in WITTGENSTEIN IN AMERICA 13 (Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd eds., 2001); CORA
DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder: How To Read the Tractatus, reprinted in THE
REALISTIC SPIRIT: WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE MIND 179 (1991) [hereinafter
DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder]; Cora Diamond, Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, 55 PHIL. Q. 78 (2005).
109. Edmund Dain, Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 25 S. AFR. J.
PHIL. 91, 92 (2006) (“[T]here are, for austerity, no logically distinct kinds of nonsense; all
nonsense, logically speaking, is on a par.”).
110. Brand, supra note 106, at 332 (quoting DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder, supra
note 108, at 181). It was Diamond who first wrote that the ineffable interpretation of
Wittgenstein read the philosopher as “chickening out.” DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder,
supra note 108, at 181.
111. Marie McGinn, Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, 49 PHIL. Q. 491, 491–92 (1999); see also Brand, supra note 106, at 326 (“The say/show
distinction is meant to liberate us from the mental torture of a mind obsessively occupied with
itself, chasing after itself in a movement that is increasingly vacuous, isolated, and cold.”);
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of the pointless and potentially harmful effort of trying to find
112
meaning in nonsense. On this reading, “the whole talk of the limits
of language is confused; there is nothing that language cannot say.
Language can represent every possible fact in the world and there are
113
no other-worldly facts.” After all, Wittgenstein himself said that
114
“[t]he limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” And
although Russell’s introduction to the book seems to support the
ineffability reading, Wittgenstein thought that Russell had not “got
115
hold of my main contention.”
In an effort to avoid joining a debate it wishes merely to
describe, this brief description of the ineffable and resolute readings
inevitably simplifies and flattens them. Subtleties abound; variations
116
are common. The goal here is simply to suggest that on either view
nonsense can be cognitively illuminating—meaningless speech, in
other words, can have value as a means to truth. For adherents of the
ineffable view, nonsense can demonstrate the existence of important

Moore & Sullivan, supra note 69, at 179 (“There is nothing ineffable. There is only the
temptation to see sense where it is lacking. Wittgenstein’s aim is therapeutic.”).
112. See Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense, supra note 108, at 196 (“[T]he aim for the
Tractarian elucidation is to reveal (through the employment of mere nonsense) that what
appears to be substantial nonsense is mere nonsense.”); see also Cheung, supra note 13, at 200
(concluding that, according to Diamond and Conant, “the Tractatus is not trying to help anyone
see any unsayable insights,” but that “the aim of the Tractatus is merely to liberate nonsense
utterers from nonsense, and that this is to be achieved by the non-frame sentences serving as
elucidations”).
113. Brand, supra note 106, at 330.
114. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 5.6, at 149 (emphasis omitted).
115. As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell:
I’m afraid you haven’t really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole
business of logical prop[osition]s is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of
what can be expressed [gesagt] by prop[osition]s—i.e. by language—(and, which
comes to the same, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by
prop[osition]s, but only shown [gezeigt]; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of
philosophy.
Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell (Aug. 19, 1919), in LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN: LETTERS TO RUSSELL, KEYNES AND MOORE 71, 71 (G.H. von Wright ed.,
1974) (alterations in original).
116. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 106, at 312, 330 (defending an “existential-performative”
reading of Wittgenstein, which would hold that “[t]here is a showing that is not a saying but
what is shown is nothing beyond language; rather it is the very existence of language—its ability
to perform sense”); Cheung, supra note 13, at 199 n.13 (noting that “[t]he resolute reading
allows numerous variants,” which have been classified “into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions based
on their different views on the nature of the frame”).
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but perhaps unsayable truths. A great deal of art might do just that.
And for adherents of the resolute view, nonsense can be a tool to save
us from useless and potentially misleading efforts to establish
meaning when none can be found. It is therapeutic—intellectually
and not just emotionally so.
But high-level epistemological debates are not the only contexts
in which nonsense can contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Much
118
as falsehood can demonstrate truth,
nonsense can illuminate
meaning by demonstrating its boundaries. The Tractatus is not unique
in that regard. It has been said that Carroll created his nonsense verse
“not to put anything in doubt or to entertain any new conceptual
119
possibilities, but . . . to remind us where sense is to be found.” So,
too, can engaging with nonsense enable individuals to better
comprehend truth and meaning. This is certainly the case with regard
to art, which as discussed above is often overtly nonsensical. Art can,
as the Supreme Court has recognized, “affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
120
characterizes all artistic expression,” even when it lacks meaning.
As William Charlton puts it, “[W]hereas we outgrow play with spoons
and handkerchiefs, our intellectual faculties will always benefit from
121
the quickening effect of good nonsense.”

117. Hegel, for one, believed that art was useful—albeit not as much as philosophy—as a
guide to truth. See Nahmod, supra note 91, at 232 (citing 1 G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FINE ART 15–16 (F.P.B. Osmaston trans., 1920)).
118. See N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false statement
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”
(quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1, 20 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989))); MILL, supra, at 20 (concluding that silencing speech
“rob[s] the human race” because even when an opinion is false, its contrast with the truth will
more clearly illuminate the latter); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of
Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 1203, 1203 (2008) (“False statements often have
value in themselves, and we should protect them even in some situations where we are not
concerned with chilling truthful speech. . . . False speech, therefore, is valuable because it is an
essential part of a larger system that works to increase society’s knowledge.”).
119. Tilghman, supra note 24, at 262.
120. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to motion
pictures); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) (“Art can
carry ideas and information, but it also goes beyond logical, rational and discursive
communication. It provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other worlds, enlarging individual
perspective and strengthening individual judgment.”).
121. Charlton, supra note 4, at 360.
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2. Autonomy. The most potentially expansive theory of the First
Amendment is that speech deserves constitutional protection because
122
and to the degree that it furthers individual autonomy. Professor
Martin Redish, perhaps the most prominent defender of this view, has
argued that “all forms of expression that further the self-realization
value, which justifies the democratic system as well as free speech’s
123
role in it, are deserving of full constitutional protection.” Professor
Ed Baker similarly argued that speech “should receive constitutional
protection . . . because and to the extent that it is a manifestation of
124
individual autonomy.”
The expansiveness of the autonomy
conception leaves its defenders with a vast territory to patrol, because
nearly any act can be described as a manifestation of individual
autonomy.
The very breadth of the autonomy view comfortably
encompasses many forms of meaningless speech, for nonsense can
surely manifest autonomy whether or not it “develop[s] the rational
125
faculties.” After all, much of what we think and feel is impossible to
126
express in words. This may be a result of deficiencies in our shared
language, our limited individual vocabularies, or “practical, social, or
psychological impediments to our using even the linguistic resources
127
available to us.” Whatever the reason for these limits, or whether

122. There are potentially important distinctions within what I have called the autonomy
view—some scholars trumpet the values of self-realization or self-fulfillment instead. For
simplicity’s sake, I have grouped them together here.
123. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982)
(footnote omitted). Tom Scanlon once defended a similar viewpoint, see generally, e.g., Thomas
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) [hereinafter
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression], but has since done his best to repudiate it, see
T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541,
546 (2011) (“As someone who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy as the centerpiece of
a theory of freedom of expression, my position in the Dantean Inferno of free speech debates
seems to be repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no matter how I criticize them.”
(footnote omitted)).
124. C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997);
see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 6–7 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s self-realization).
125. Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 80 (1989) (“[E]xpression may promote
human flourishing in ways other than developing the rational faculties. Freedom of speech may
allow the expression of powerful emotions and provide an outlet for the creative impulse in a
variety of forms, including literature, drama, and the visual arts.”).
126. See, e.g., Moore & Sullivan, supra note 69, at 173 (“Most of us have at one time or
another found that we cannot express how we feel about something.”).
127. Id.
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we recognize when they are transgressed, our efforts to express what
lies beyond them create a kind of nonsense—statements that are
unverifiable, fail to describe any possible state of affairs, or attempt to
128
say what can only be shown.
And yet from the perspective of individual autonomy and selffulfillment, we may have very good reason not to pass over such
things in silence. Though arguably nonsensical, beyond those limits
129
may lie our chaotic, contradictory, and even “ineffable” selves.
Efforts to represent them may lack meaning according to some
definitions, but they are also a very important part of individual and
130
social human development. Even Wittgenstein recognized that
131
there was a kind of mystical value in some kinds of nonsense.
As a First Amendment matter, these issues—and the autonomy
value of nonsense—are most salient with regard to artistic speech, the
constitutional status of which has been a perennial problem for the
132
First Amendment. Some courts and scholars simply take it for
granted that the Amendment must cover art, and do little to explain
133
why. Perhaps equally common are efforts to suggest that art does in
fact have constitutionally salient meaning. As Professor Marci
Hamilton notes, “Mirroring the commentators’ approach, the Court
tends to protect art only to the extent that it is a vehicle for ideas,

128. For a description of the representational approach, under which these would be
considered nonsensical, see infra Part II.A.
129. Cf. ROSEN, supra note 62, at 13 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, when
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, in the ‘Chandos Letter,’ asserted the inadequacy of language to
express anything profoundly individual and subjective, one of the first words to have completely
lost its meaning for him was ‘freedom.’”).
130. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 79 (“Self-preservation cannot be achieved merely by
following principles; it depends on the realization of human potentials, and these can only be
brought to light by literature, not by systematic discourse.” (quoting WOLFGANG ISER, THE
ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE 76 (1978))).
131. See generally JAMES R. ATKINSON, THE MYSTICAL IN WITTGENSTEIN’S EARLY
WRITINGS (2009).
132. See Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3 (2007) (“The
Supreme Court has ruled that particular instances of art speech are protected expression, but
has not supplied a satisfactory rationale for protecting art. . . . Major First Amendment theorists
likewise have not devoted substantial attention to art speech.”).
133. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within . . . First Amendment
protection.”); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“A rule
cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas.”); Tushnet, supra note
9, at 170 n.4 (“Much of the secondary literature on art and the First Amendment assumes art’s
coverage and derives First Amendment rules to deal with specific problems . . . .”).
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especially political ideas.” For many works of art, this approach is
135
perfectly adequate, particularly given the extremely expansive
136
definitions of “meaning” that courts and scholars apply to art. But
not all art can fit into the meaning-dependent model, no matter how
far the concept of meaning is stretched, which raises what Hamilton
describes as “the difficulty of explaining how a first amendment
theory valuing speech for its rationally comprehensible ideas can
137
comfortably accommodate the phenomenon of art.”
Perhaps instead we should take seriously the notion that some
138
art is nonsensical. Indeed, if works of art contained articulable
139
ideas, one suspects that they would be said and not sung. Tushnet
puts the point powerfully, and with apt illustrations:
To begin, many modern sculptors would deny that they “intend” to
express anything in their work. Rather, they seek to explore the
relation between shape and space, nothing more (or less). Nor . . . is
the abjuration of any intent to express limited to sculptors. . . . Art as
form—being rather than meaning—is not intended to communicate,
even though it may sometimes do so. A related point is that
sometimes artworks are engagements with a tradition. As such, it is
140
not clear that they “mean” anything.

134. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 105.
135. See id. at 108 (“Because a significant number of artworks can be construed to have
discursive content, existing theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide
protection to a degree.”); see also Fromer, supra note 100, at 1478 n.253 (“[T]he more
meaningful something is, the better people like it. At least for artistically naïve observers,
meaning is by far the most important determinant of preference.” (alteration in original)
(quoting COLIN MARTINDALE, THE CLOCKWORK MUSE: THE PREDICTABILITY OF ARTISTIC
CHANGE 42–43 (1990))).
136. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (1996) (“[P]aintings, photographs,
prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view [them],
and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); Eberle, supra note 132, at 7
(“[A]rt speech is the autonomous use of the artist’s creative process to make and fashion form,
color, symbol, image, movement or other communication of meaning that is made manifest in a
tangible medium.”).
137. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 104.
138. See generally, e.g., HERBERT READ, ICON AND IDEA (1955) (arguing that art is not
always the product of cognitive activity and that the icon sometimes precedes the idea).
139. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 74 (quoting Isadora Duncan as saying, “If I could say
it, I wouldn’t have to dance it.”); see also JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 74 (1934) (“If all
meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not
exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately visible and
audible qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put into
words is to deny their distinctive existence.”).
140. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 188–89 (footnotes omitted).
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Rather than trying to impute meaning to such artistic speech, we
could instead ask whether nonsense for nonsense’s sake—like art for
141
art’s sake —serves important First Amendment values.
Among those values, autonomy is the most natural candidate.
Surely one of the fundamental goals of artistic expression, after all, is
142
to try to say or represent the inexpressible. To do so is to speak
nonsense, and yet no one could doubt the importance of such
nonsense to the autonomy and self-development of those speaking
143
it. It can serve the autonomy interests of viewers as well. Aesthetic
judgments are part of the “pleasure of freedom itself,” and are in that
way “disinterested and ruleless, unconstrained by . . . appetite” or “a
144
master concept to which they must conform.” Art is therefore
sometimes important for individual autonomy precisely because its
145
lack of meaning removes it from the realm of knowledge.
This is not to say that the autonomy principle provides an
unmitigated case for protecting nonsense. Misleading covert
nonsense, for example, can further the autonomy of the person
speaking it while simultaneously interfering with the autonomy of
146
those tricked by it. Moreover, if autonomy is intertwined with
rational cognition, covert nonsense might be a threat to autonomy
instead of a means to advance it. Many leading proponents of the

141. See Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding
that the First Amendment protects “purely artistic” expression—“art for art’s sake”).
142. Cf. Adler, supra note 10, at 1366 (quoting postmodern painter David Salle as saying
that his paintings are about “all the paintings I won’t make or can’t make”).
143. Leo Tolstoy—whom Wittgenstein “admired and read constantly,” Brand, supra note
106, at 311—suggested that creating nonsense was perhaps the only thing that humans could do
that their own creator could not. See id. (“God can do everything, it is true, but there is one
thing he cannot do, and that is speak nonsense.” (quoting LEO TOLSTOY, THE GOSPEL
ACCORDING TO TOLSTOY 11 (David Patterson ed. & trans., 1992))).
144. Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 324 (1999).
145. See id. (“Judgments of beauty are thus free in a twofold sense. They are neither driven
by desire nor determined by a rule.”); see also Charlton, supra note 4, at 356–59 (evaluating
nonsense in terms of Kant’s three types of aesthetic effect—the beautiful, the sublime, and the
funny—and concluding that the first provides the best “clue”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (“[B]eauty has constitutional
status too, and . . . the life of the imagination is as important to the human adult as the life of the
intellect.”); Nahmod, supra note 91, at 231 (“Because art is removed from knowledge and
desire, it follows for Kant that art and the beautiful cannot express ideas or take positions.”).
146. Cf. Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for
Fraudulent Inducement of Contract?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 456 (2009) (“Neo-Kantians tend to
agree that lying is an affront to autonomy. Lies interfere with the victim’s rational deliberation
and rob the victim of her prospects for making at least some sensible choices about a course of
action or belief.”).

BLOCHER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/16/2014 8:10 PM

NONSENSE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1453

autonomy approach seem to hold this view. Redish, for example,
refers to “the instrumental value in developing individuals’ mental
147
faculties so that they may reach their full intellectual potential.”
Professor Fred Schauer has similarly described the self-realization
view of the Amendment as being based on the human potential for
“personal growth, self-fulfillment, and development of the rational
148
faculties.” If these views are correct, then autonomy is limited by
rationality, and nonsense might lack constitutional salience precisely
because it is not subject to analysis on the basis of its rationality.
3. Democracy. The final major First Amendment value is
democracy. As with the autonomy and marketplace approaches,
democratic theories of the First Amendment come in many forms.
Perhaps most famously, Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the
Amendment categorically protects political speech (and only political
149
speech) against government interference. Robert Bork took a
150
similar, albeit narrower, view. More recently, Post has argued that
the primary value animating the First Amendment is that of
“democratic legitimation”: the notion that “First Amendment
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary
151
for influencing public opinion.”
Because democratic approaches to the First Amendment seem to
152
be based on the content of speech acts, it might not be immediately

147. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1984)
(emphasis added). In his original defense of the autonomy position, Scanlon argued that, on a
Millian approach, “the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize while
still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.” Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, supra note 123, at 215.
148. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49 (1982).
149. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 94 (1948) (“The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to
all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with
which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public interest.”).
150. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment protects only “criticisms of public officials and
policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and
speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”).
151. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 18; see also James Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491
(2011) (defending “the view that contemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained
as assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern
ourselves”).
152. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 149, at 26–27 (“[T]he vital point, as stated
negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of
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apparent how nonsense—which lacks cognitive content of any kind—
can be entitled to protection. After all, nonsense does not directly
convey information about voting. And yet totalitarian states often
153
ban nonrepresentational and nonsensical art. Sheldon Nahmod
points to the Soviet Union, whose leaders believed that “art should
serve only to reinforce socialist ideals and thereby inculcate
appropriate behavior; nonrepresentational art [was] considered
154
decadent, bourgeois and dangerous.” Whether or not that fear is
well-founded, it certainly is not unique to the former Soviet Union,
nor even to totalitarian states. As Hamilton notes, “Conventional
readings of Plato, for example, indicate that he believed that art
155
should be censored because it threatens order and stability.”
But these odd outliers are surely just that, and their pathologies
are not necessarily the ones with which First Amendment doctrine
need be concerned. Moreover, this only explains why some states
might seek to suppress nonsense, not why democracies should protect
it. What positive democratic value does overt nonsense serve?
Perhaps, like art, nonsense can help cultivate the kind of citizen on
whom a well-functioning democracy depends. Meiklejohn, for
example, argued that “[l]iterature and the arts must be protected by
the First Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive and
informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the
156
riches of the general welfare are created.” This may be a bit of a
stretch even on its own terms, but it does suggest a possible
connection between nonsense and democracy. Just as engaging with
nonsense can help people perceive cognitive truths in the

the issue rather than another.”). Because he focuses on media of communication, this is not
necessarily true of Post’s approach, though elsewhere I have questioned whether his theory can
really avoid an inquiry into speech’s content. See Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert
Knowledge, and the Press, 87 U. WASH. L. REV. 409, 417–23 (2012).
153. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 98–100 (discussing examples from post–Cultural
Revolution China, communist Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, and elsewhere); see also Eberle,
supra note 132, at 12–13 (discussing examples from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the
Modernist Movement); cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is
one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the
totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and
to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.”).
154. Nahmod, supra note 91, at 225; see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 172 (noting “Nazi
Germany’s suppression of ‘degenerate’ art and Soviet Russia’s promotion of socialist realist art
at the expense of abstraction”).
155. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 76.
156. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 257.
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157

perhaps it can also inform their
marketplace for ideas,
understanding and appreciation of what Brandeis referred to as
158
“political truth.”
A second possibility is that overt nonsense serves as a kind of
“safety-valve”—a way to release what might otherwise become
159
On this reading, speech “is an essential
dangerous dissent.
mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and
160
change.” The Merry Pranksters, whose escapades in their brightly
161
decorated bus were catalogued in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test,
often “tootl[ed] the multitudes,” which referred “to the way a
Prankster would stand with a flute on the bus’s roof and play sounds
162
to imitate people’s various reactions to the bus.” Such activity
probably did not convey any particularized message or “idea.” But
without that outlet, perhaps the Pranksters’ basically nonsensical
hijinks would have devolved into something more destructive.
A related argument for extending constitutional protection to
nonsense draws on institutional considerations that are especially
salient for, but not unique to, democracy conceptions of the First
Amendment: that the Amendment must protect nonsense to fully
insulate valuable and meaningful speech. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that “First Amendment freedoms need breathing
163
space to survive.” This proposition is based on the belief that speech
is “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter [its] exercise almost as
164
potently as the actual application of sanctions.” Doctrine has been
significantly shaped by that belief, perhaps most prominently in the
context of First Amendment standing doctrine, which permits people
to attack on free speech grounds a law that would concededly be

157. See supra 118–121 and accompanying text.
158. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
159. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2008) (describing safety-valve theory).
160. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
161. TOM WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1968).
162. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Ken Kesey, Author of ‘Cuckoo’s Nest,’ Who Defined the
Psychedelic Era, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, A47; see WOLFE, supra note 161, at 100
(“Tootling the Multitudes”).
163. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
164. Id.
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165

constitutional as applied to them, so long as the law reaches a
166
substantial amount of protected speech.
The nothingness of nonsense might be exactly the kind of
breathing space that sense needs to thrive. After all, the Court has
recognized that, if only truthful speech were protected, people would
“tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful
167
zone.’” Perhaps if only meaningful speech were protected, people
would shy away from pushing the boundaries of logic and language
for fear of speaking unprotected nonsense. As the Court reasoned in
168
Cohen v. California, “[F]orbid[ding] particular words . . . also run[s]
169
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.” Nonsense
might merit protection precisely because of its instrumental value in
protecting meaningful speech.
II. THE MEANING OF MEANING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The discussion up until this point has described an important but
underexplored category of speech—nonsense—and made a
preliminary case for its constitutional protection. In the process, it has
flanked another target: the very concept of meaning itself. This is
dangerous quarry, particularly when wounded by the apparent threat
to its claim on the First Amendment’s territory. With due concern for
the hazards, though, it is difficult to imagine a better way to consider
meaning than by, as the preceding discussion has, exploring its
absence. The goal of this Part is to use that analysis to confront the
meaning of “meaning” for First Amendment purposes.
It would be easier, perhaps, to avoid the issue by simply saying
that meaning does not matter for the First Amendment. But a wide
range of doctrine and scholarship suggests that the easy road is
foreclosed, and that meaning—generally equated with ideas,
viewpoints, or content—is a necessary ingredient of constitutionally
salient speech. As Professor John Greenman notes, “Frequently,
behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys

165. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
166. Id. at 615.
167. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
169. Id. at 26.
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170

‘ideas’ or ‘information.’” This meaning-dependent approach is
embedded in constitutional doctrine in various ways, and has been
buttressed by thoughtful scholarship. Peter Tiersma, for example,
proposes that “the first requirement for communication by conduct is
that the conduct be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention.
This is simply an extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker
normally cannot use sounds to communicate unless the sounds have
171
some meaning attached to them.” Likewise, Melville Nimmer’s
influential account of symbolic speech holds that “symbolic speech
requires not merely that given conduct results in a meaning effect, but
that the actor causing such conduct must intend such a meaning effect
172
by his conduct.”
But the meaning-dependent approach also raises difficult
problems, for the reasons suggested in Part I: nonsense is pervasive,
and much of it has a strong relationship to the First Amendment’s
core values. Moreover, despite their apparent insistence on the
importance of meaning, courts and scholars have done very little to
173
establish what meaning means. That imprecision, in turn, provides
space to craft a doctrinal and theoretical apparatus that allows
meaning to play a central role in First Amendment discourse without
completely denying constitutional coverage to nonsense. This is no
easy task, however, for the necessary tools are scarce and scattered
throughout the First Amendment’s messy workshop.

170. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347; see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the
Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly every theory of free
speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to
inform people through the content of one’s message.” (emphasis added)).
171. Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1559. Tiersma creates a two-part test for determining whether
nonverbal communication falls within the freedom of speech: “First, action must have meaning,
either by way of convention or in some other manner. Second, the actor must intend to
communicate by means of the action.” Id. at 1526; see also id. at 1561 (“An intent to
communicate obviously requires an intent to convey information.”).
172. Nimmer, supra note 3, at 37. Nimmer also explains that “[t]he meaning effect is a signal
that registers in the mind of at least one observer. The nonmeaning effect is not dependent upon
the reaction of other minds.” Id. at 36. As noted above, despite its reliance on meaning, Nimmer
considered his approach broad enough to reach artistic speech lacking verbal and cognitive
content. See id .at 35.
173. Cf. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1338–39 (“Everybody knows that communication is
important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech law
protects it. Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it. But no
one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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Fortunately, craftsmen in adjacent workshops can provide useful
guidance. The relationship between meaning and language has been
the central obsession of analytic philosophy for the better part of a
century. Of course, analytic philosophers are primarily concerned
with determining what can meaningfully be said, not what kinds of
speech are or should be protected from government sanction. But
with regard to the specific issue of meaning, their hard-won advances
are directly relevant to the questions that constitutional law has set
for itself. Moreover, as the following discussion shows, echoes of their
efforts can already be heard in First Amendment discourse.
Two major schools of thought have emerged, which, with
regrettably necessary simplification, can be called the
“representational” and “use” approaches to meaning. The former,
associated with Wittgenstein in his early writings, Bertrand Russell,
and logical positivism, finds meaning in the connection between
174
language and extralinguistic concepts.
Language that fails to
represent such concepts is nonsensical. Some First Amendment
discourse implicitly utilizes such an approach. The authorities cited
above, for example, generally employ a more-or-less representational
175
176
approach to meaning by searching for “ideas” or “content.” The
frequent scholarly explorations of nonrepresentational art also seem
motivated by a representational approach, for nonrepresentation is
only relevant to the degree that representationalism itself is
constitutionally salient.
The lessons of analytic philosophy suggest that these are the
wrong questions to ask. As Paul Chevigny explains:
Having abandoned the view of language as a “copy” of the “real
world,” a set of names for objects, and assertions that have meaning
only to the extent that they faithfully represent reality, philosophers
increasingly think of language as a system of discourse in which
assertions can have “meaning” and be “true” not as representations

174. “Representational” is used here as a rough and imperfect label for many related
schools of thought, from foundationalism to logical positivism. Paying the inevitable costs of
oversimplification nevertheless seems worthwhile, since my purpose here is not to illuminate
anything specific to those philosophies, but simply to show how, generally speaking, they might
inform the First Amendment.
175. See, e.g., Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347 (surveying various First Amendment
arguments, including one that holds “that communication is the conveyance of ‘ideas’”).
176. See Volokh, supra note 170, at 1304 (“Under nearly every theory of free speech, the
right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to inform people
through the content of one’s message.”).
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of “reality” but as ideas for which good reasons can be found in
177
other parts of the system of discourse.

That is, if meaning is relevant for First Amendment purposes, it must
be found in the way language is used, not in what it represents. The
following discussion attempts to show what that entails as a
constitutional matter and why it represents an improvement over the
representational approach. And yet bringing use meaning to the
forefront of First Amendment doctrine drags with it a new set of
problems, including the inherent difficulty of identifying the language
games that imbue speech with meaning.
The goal of this Part is to suggest how First Amendment
discourse and doctrine can fruitfully utilize the concept of meaning,
not to fully define speech, say anything new about analytic
philosophy, or—perish the thought—provide an original or
178
comprehensive reading of Wittgenstein. The following accounts of
analytic philosophy will be familiar, if simplified, to philosophers; the
First Amendment theory and doctrine will be familiar to legal
scholars. Indeed, this is far from the first article to suggest
connections between them. But its angle of approach—through the
region of nonsense—is novel for First Amendment scholarship, and it
aims to provide a fresh and useful, if complicated and imperfect, way
to think about meaning for First Amendment purposes.
A. Representational Meaning
In 1899, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote: “We must think
things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words
into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and
179
the true.” For a man whose contribution to American jurisprudence

177. Chevigny, supra note 95, at 162 (footnote omitted).
178. Wittgenstein’s influence is so magnetic that the very act of citing him has become a
language game of its own. See Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
789, 796–97 (1992) (noting the signaling value of citations to Wittgenstein “[i]n some legal
academic circles”); see also Dennis W. Arrow, “Rich,” “Textured,” and “Nuanced”:
Constitutional “Scholarship” and Constitutional Messianism at the Millenium, 78 TEX. L. REV.
149, 149 n.* (1999) (positing the same phenomenon with regard to law review editors).
179. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460
(1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 9, 1925), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916–1935, at 737, 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (noting how difficult it is to
“think accurately—and think things not words”).
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can largely be measured by his mastery of language, this might
come as something of a surprise. The remark suggests that the
meaning of words lies in “the facts for which they stand.” In that way,
it is emblematic of the representational approach to meaning—one
that locates meaning in the relationship between language and
181
extralinguistic concepts. Words that do not denote such concepts
are nonsensical and, if the doctrinal descriptions set out above are
accurate, fall outside the boundaries of the First Amendment. But as
the remainder of this Section shows, such a representational approach
has serious defects as a guide for constitutional law.
182
Holmes is often classified as a pragmatist, and though his circle
of scientifically and philosophically inclined friends was broad and
183
deep, it apparently did not include those in Vienna and Cambridge
who were concurrently exploring the relationship between “things”
and “words.” Even as Holmes was penning his monumentally
influential free speech opinions, and essentially giving the First
184
Amendment its first normative theory, those thinkers—Russell and
Wittgenstein prominent but not alone among them—were probing
185
the meaning of meaning itself.
In the early 1900s, Russell was perhaps the world’s preeminent
logician and mathematician. His Principia Mathematica was published
in the 1910s, just as Holmes was laying the normative foundations of

180. See Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. xvii (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
181. This does not mean, of course, that each word has only one thing to which it is
connected. As Holmes noted elsewhere, “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it
is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
Conversely, the same “thing” may be connected to multiple words, as in Gottlob Frege’s famous
example of the “Morning Star” and “Evening Star,” both of which refer to Venus.
182. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788 (1989)
(“Holmes as legal pragmatist is hardly a new idea. His associations with Charles Sanders Peirce
and William James, as well as his admiration for John Dewey, have led a number of intellectual
historians to count him as an adherent and even a founder of the pragmatist movement.”).
183. See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) (describing the social
and intellectual “club” that included such luminaries as Holmes, William James, and Charles
Peirce).
184. See Post, supra note 85, at 2356.
185. Starting with Russell and Cambridge means omitting any number of important
thinkers, including Gottlob Frege and the Austrian logical positivists, who arguably deserve
credit for the very creation of analytic philosophy. However costly, such omissions are necessary
for the sake of brevity and clarity. Fuller accounts can be found in THE LINGUISTIC TURN:
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard M. Rorty ed., 1992).
THE
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the First Amendment. As part of his wide-ranging intellectual
explorations, Russell contemplated what it means for a statement to
have meaning. He eventually came to believe that statements are
meaningful, even if not verifiable, so long as they express a possible
state of affairs: “[A] sentence ‘p’ is significant if ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I
186
doubt that p’ or etc., can describe a perceived fact . . . .” Thus a
statement like “The King of France is bald” can be meaningful
because it denotes a concept, even though the thing it denotes (the
187
King of France) does not exist. Statements that fail to denote are
nonsensical. Russell’s famous example of such nonsense was the
188
statement “[Q]uadruplicity drinks procrastination.”
At around the same time as he was developing this approach to
meaning, Russell took on a new pupil, whom he at first referred to as
“[m]y ferocious German . . . armour-plated against all assaults of
189
reasoning.” Within one academic term, Russell learned that his
German was Austrian and quite capable of his own assaultive
reasoning. Russell was intellectually smitten: “I love him & feel he
190
will solve the problems I am too old to solve.” The ferocious
Austrian was, of course, Wittgenstein. For him, as Professor Dennis
Patterson says, “all philosophical problems [were] ultimately
191
problems of language.”
Although the focus on problems of
language was consistent throughout Wittgenstein’s career, his
approach to them can be divided into two basically distinct phases,
only the first of which fits the representational mold described here.
For the “early” Wittgenstein, author of the spectacularly
impenetrable Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, sense consisted in “a
determinate relation between a proposition and an independent state
192
of affairs.”

186. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 181 (1940).
187. See generally Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905) (propounding a
“theory of denoting” that holds that “denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves,
but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning”).
188. RUSSELL, supra note 186, at 166.
189. RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 40 (1990).
190. Id. at 41.
191. Patterson, supra note 1, at 938.
192. Brand, supra note 106, at 314; see also Kavka, supra note 83, at 1457 (concluding that
the Tractatus is based on the belief that “the function of language is to model or picture the
world”).
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To explore their “relation,” Wittgenstein focused on the
relationship between thought and expression. As the preface or
“frame” of the Tractatus explained:
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not
to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a
limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this
limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be
thought).
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies
193
on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

That limit represents the boundary of both meaning and of reality. As
Wittgenstein explained in the koan-like propositions of the book
itself: “The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a
194
model of the reality as we think it is.” Anything that is not a
proposition is, strictly speaking, nonsense, for anything that is not a
proposition fails to present a picture of reality: “Only the proposition
195
has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.”
It follows that there is no way to comprehend or create reality but
through language, and thus “[t]he limits of my language mean the
196
limits of my world.”
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all concepts are
197
reducible to language. Wittgenstein was obsessed with the notion
that some things “can not be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only
198
shown . . . ; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.”
As Elizabeth Anscombe, a distinguished philosopher and former
student of Wittgenstein’s, later explained:
[A]n important part is played in the Tractatus by the things which,
though they cannot be ‘said’, are yet ‘shewn’ or ‘displayed’. That is
to say: it would be right to call them ‘true’ if, per impossible, they

193. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27.
194. Id. § 4.01, at 63.
195. Id. § 3.3, at 51.
196. Id. § 5.6, at 149 (emphasis omitted); see id. § 3.032, at 43, 45 (“To present in language
anything which ‘contradicts logic’ is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a
figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not
exist.”).
197. For a description of the debate between “ineffable” and “resolute” readings of
Wittgenstein, see supra notes 103–17 and accompanying text.
198. See Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, supra note 115, at 71 (first
alteration in original).
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could be said; in fact they cannot be called true, since they cannot be
said, but ‘can be shewn’, or ‘are exhibited’, in the propositions saying
199
the various things that can be said.

Whatever their importance, attempts to say these things inevitably
result in nonsense. Holmes seemed to have something similar in mind
when he suggested the difference between thinking things and
200
thinking words.
Though Wittgenstein himself would apparently later abandon
201
it, the effort to find meaning in the relationship between words and
things certainly did not end with the Tractatus. The influence of the
representational approach is palpable in the work of A.J. Ayer, the
great English logical positivist, whose Language, Truth, and Logic
202
defends among other things the “verification principle.” That
principle holds that statements are nonsensical when they are not
203
analytically or empirically verifiable. A similar focus on verifiability
seems to underlie popular intuitions about the relationship between
meaning and truth. For example, Wikipedia’s rules provide that “[a]ll
material in Wikipedia mainspace, including everything in articles, lists
204
and captions, must be verifiable.”
The influence of the representational approach extends, albeit
uncredited, to First Amendment doctrine itself. This is perhaps most
apparent in what John Greenman calls the Supreme Court’s
“ideaism”—the principle that “behavior is . . . covered by the First
205
Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or ‘information.’” The notion that
ideas—cognitive meanings—are the focus of the First Amendment is

199. ANSCOMBE, supra note 106, at 162.
200. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
202. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 31 (Dover Publ’ns 1952)
(1936).
203. See id. at 41 (“[E]very empirical hypothesis must be relevant to some actual, or
possible, experience, so that a statement which is not relevant to any experience is not an
empirical hypothesis, and accordingly has no factual content. . . . [T]his is precisely what the
principle of verifiability asserts.”); Chevigny, supra note 95, at 163 (“If a proposition was not
true or false by definition or did not give rise to an empirical prediction that could, in principle,
be verified, the proposition was meaningless.”).
204. Wikipedia:Verifiability,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Verifiability (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Robert Post quotes an earlier version of the rule: “[T]he
threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—that is, whether readers are able
to check that material added to Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not
whether we think it is true.” POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
205. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347–48.
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so often repeated that it might sometimes pass unnoticed. In New
206
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court explained that the
Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
207
social changes desired by the people.’” Since then, the Court has
often
invoked
the
principle
that
“[t]he
First
Amendment . . . embodies ‘[o]ur profound national commitment to
208
209
the free exchange of ideas.’” In Miller v. California, for example,
the Court seemed to suggest that ideas are so important that the
existence of one is sufficient for constitutional coverage: “All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate
of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment’s]
210
guaranties . . . .” By the same logic, the Court has also indicated that
putative speech acts such as fighting words and obscenity fall outside
the boundaries of the First Amendment in part because they “are no
211
essential part of any exposition of ideas.”
A representational approach to meaning similarly seems to
animate some of the Court’s efforts to define what kinds of nonverbal
conduct qualify for First Amendment coverage. By now “[i]t is well
settled that the First Amendment’s protections extend to nonverbal
212
‘expressive conduct’ or ‘symbolic speech.’” And meaning seems to
be the ingredient that makes that extension possible. In West Virginia
213
State Board of Education v. Barnette, for example, the Court

206. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
207. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Police
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought, free from government censorship.”).
208. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)); see N.Y. State Bd. of
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (“The First Amendment creates an open
marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without government
interference.”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The hallmark of the protection of
free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’ . . . .” (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
209. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
210. Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
211. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). It also matters that such
speech acts “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id. at 572.
212. Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.18 (2005).
213. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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indicated that expressive conduct (in that case, saluting a flag) is
214
“speech” for constitutional purposes because it conveys “ideas.” A
215
similar premise seems to animate Spence v. Washington, the Court’s
most direct effort to define the essential elements that transform
conduct into speech. In that case, the Court set out to evaluate
whether conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of
216
communication to fall within the scope” of the First Amendment.
The test it created asks whether “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
217
it.” Conduct that satisfies both prongs of this test is considered to be
expressive. Spence therefore effectively doubles down on the
importance of representational meaning, requiring both that the
speaker intend to convey it (in “particularized” form, no less) and
also that there be a “great” likelihood that the audience understand
it.
Despite its frequent appearances in First Amendment doctrine,
the representational approach to meaning is a poor guide to what
speech the First Amendment actually does or should protect. Indeed,
the representational approach to meaning, combined with the
meaning-dependent approach to the First Amendment discussed
218
above, leads to the problems of underinclusion suggested by Part I.

214. See id. at 632 (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”).
215. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1537 (referring
to Spence as “the only real test that the Court has articulated to identify ‘speech’ in the First
Amendment sphere”). Tiersma’s use of “only” was probably accurate at the time, but it now
needs some qualification, given that Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and other cases seem to have replaced or at the very least
altered Spence’s test. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), rather than applying (or even citing) Spence, the Court asked whether
the activity at issue was “inherently expressive,” such that a viewer could understand its
meaning without further explanation. See id. at 66. Excluding military recruiters from campus to
express disagreement with the military’s policies did not meet this test, the Court found, because
such exclusion might well be the result of room scarcity. Id.
216. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“Johnson’s
burning of the flag was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication’ to
implicate the First Amendment.” (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409)). But see Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]lag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or
roar . . . .”).
217. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11; see R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First
Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1238 (2010)
(“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some more or less determinate
understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the constitutional sense is present.”).
218. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
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As Greenman points out, ideaism “fails to predict what the First
219
220
Amendment actually covers.” In United States v. O’Brien, the
Court clarified that the mere intent to convey meaning is not
sufficient for First Amendment coverage: “We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
221
express an idea.”
Nor is a connection between language and concept necessary for
the Amendment’s protections to attach. Music, for example, is clearly
222
protected by the First Amendment, even though a great deal of it
does not convey meaning in any standard sense. As Richard Posner
writes, “[E]ven if ‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘opinion’ are
broadly defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if
music is regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding
223
ideas and opinions.” In other ways, too, the Constitution protects
efforts to say the unsayable. Justice Harlan explained in Cohen v.
California that “much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
224
emotions as well.”
Under the representational approach to meaning, expression of
225
the “inexpressible” is by definition nonsensical. But as Justice
219. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1348; see also Post, supra note 42, at 1252 (showing that the
Spence test is overinclusive); Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 773 (showing that the Spence test is
underinclusive).
220. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
221. Id. at 376.
222. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form of
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”); see also Reed v.
Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If the defendants passed an ordinance
forbidding the playing of rock and roll music . . . , they would be infringing a First Amendment
right, even if the music had no political message—even if it had no words . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
223. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also David
Munkittrick, Note, Music as Speech: A First Amendment Category unto Itself, 62 FED. COMM.
L.J. 665, 668 (2010) (“[N]o single First Amendment theory fully explains protection of music as
speech.”). But see ROSEN, supra note 62, at 11 (“Felix Mendelssohn found the meaning of music
more precise, not less, than language, but that is because music means what it is, not what it
says.”).
224. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emphasis added).
225. See AYER, supra note 202, at 118 (“If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is
something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense
when he describes it.”).
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Harlan suggests, and as Part I argues, it is also properly covered by
the First Amendment. It follows that the representational approach,
whatever its intuitive appeal, is a poor guide to the boundaries of the
First Amendment. If it is to matter, “meaning” must lie elsewhere
than in the relationship between speech and concepts.
B. Use Meaning
The best place to find an alternative to the representational
approach associated with Russell and Wittgenstein is in the work of
Wittgenstein himself. His later thought—especially the enormously
influential concept of language games—reshaped the whole of
analytic philosophy, putting it on the “linguistic turn” that led to
speech-act theory, ordinary-language philosophy, and a host of other
important developments. From these developments emerges a new
way of thinking about language and meaning that is ultimately a
better guide for the First Amendment.
After leaving philosophical work behind for nearly a decade,
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 and took a new approach
to the relationship between language, meaning, and the world. This
work culminated in the posthumous publication of Philosophical
Investigations. It was here that Wittgenstein “reject[ed] the search for
a unified account of language’s internal logic, which had occupied the
226
bulk of . . . the Tractatus.” Indeed, he described the Philosophical
Investigations as a rejoinder to “what logicians have said about the
structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico227
Philosophicus.)”
Instead of the picture theory of meaning that animated his
earlier work, Wittgenstein now focused on “language games” as
defining the limits of meaning and, therefore, the world: “I shall also
call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is
228
woven, the ‘language-game’.” The term, he said, was “meant to
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of
229
an activity, or of a form of life.” The nature of these games became

226. Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of
Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11 (2010).
227. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 23.
228. Id. § 7.
229. Id. § 23; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (“‘Form of life’ is a
technical term meant to convey the multiplicity of both possible ways of living and possible ways
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Wittgenstein’s focus for the rest of his life. As Patterson explains,
“The central tenet of Wittgenstein’s writing after 1929 is that
knowledge is not achieved by the individual subject’s grasp of a
connection between word and object. Rather, knowledge turns out to
be the grasp of the topography of a word’s uses in activities into
230
which language is woven.”
The language-games approach locates meaning in language’s use,
not in its representation of the world. As Wittgenstein put it in the
Philosophical Investigations, “For a large class of cases—though not
for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined
231
thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” The way to
identify meaning, therefore, is not necessarily to ask whether a
putative speaker has given content to signs in his propositions, but
rather whether he has followed the rules of the relevant language
game. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson explain: “As a tradition now
identified with Wittgenstein and his successors insists, there are only
‘practices,’ each constituted by inchoate and unformalizable standards
that establish one’s statements . . . as ‘legitimately assertable’ by
persons within the interpretive community that constitutes the
232
practice in question.”
The tradition to which Balkin and Levinson refer has now spread
233
throughout analytic philosophy. The later Wittgenstein is therefore
important not only on his own terms, but also because he shaped so
many other philosophical developments throughout the past
234
century. The branches on that tree are too numerous to count and

of seeing and responding to the world. The ability to speak a language is the ability to engage in
practices within a form of life in which that language has meaning.”).
230. Patterson, supra note 37, at 303–04; see also Fiss, supra note 37, at 177 (describing
Wittgenstein’s view that “we understand a concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we
can successfully use that concept within a language game or a defined context”).
231. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 43; see also Jonathan Yovel, What Is Contract Law
“About”? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of “Skeletal Promises,” 94 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 939
(2000) (noting that Wittgenstein and the theories of performative language that owe him a debt
“all share a basic insight: that language is not primarily about meaning in the traditional,
semantical sense associated with representationalism” but rather that “language is primarily
about action—speech and texts are acts, and they perform things in the social world and bring
about different kinds of effects”).
232. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1597, 1604 (1991) (footnote omitted).
233. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein’s influence is universal, nor that
the developments discussed here are the only important ones in analytic philosophy.
234. See Chevigny, supra note 95, at 163–72.
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too complex to describe, but include the work of Paul Grice, the
speech-act theory associated most closely with J.L. Austin and John
236
237
R. Searle, and ordinary-language philosophy.
Most importantly for present purposes, the use-meaning
approach has gained traction in First Amendment doctrine and
scholarship. Post, for example, argues that Marcel Duchamp’s The
Fountain—a urinal turned on its side—is properly recognized as
artistic speech precisely because of the shared norms of the artistic
238
community. This is because it is a “form[] of communication that
239
sociologically we recognize as art.” Taking a similar approach, Amy
Adler points to the example of Annie Sprinkle, a performance artist
who also works in the pornography industry: “When asked if anything
made Sprinkle’s performance at the Kitchen [Center for the
Performing Arts] ‘art’ and her performance for Screw [magazine]

235. Grice’s basic argument—vastly oversimplified—was that for A to mean something by
X, X must be uttered with an intention of producing some belief or effect in the listener, B, by
means of B’s recognition of A’s intent. See generally H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377
(1957). Later, Grice would further develop the idea of speaker meaning via analyzing sentences
as units of meaning and differentiating between indicative and imperative meaning. See
generally H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUND.
LANGUAGE 225 (1968).
236. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS (1979); JOHN
R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND (1983); JOHN R.
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
As suggested by the title of Austin’s seminal How To Do Things with Words, the
central insight of speech-act theory is that speech can do things, as for example when a person
says, “I am sorry.” Uttering those words does not merely report meaning by describing a
situation or a state of mind, but actually performs the act of apologizing. The same can be said
of promises, AUSTIN, supra, at 10; the words “I do” in the context of a wedding ceremony, id. at
6; or—as Akhil Amar has suggested, channeling Austin—the phrase “We the People . . . do
ordain and establish” in the Preamble of the United States Constitution, AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005).
237. Toril Moi, “They Practice Their Trades in Different Worlds”: Concepts in
Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy, 40 NEW LITERARY HIST. 801, 802 (2009)
(defining ordinary-language philosophy as “the philosophical tradition after Wittgenstein and J.
L. Austin as established . . . in [Stanley] Cavell’s work”). See generally STANLEY CAVELL, MUST
WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (updated ed. 2002).
238. Post, supra note 42, at 1253–54; cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4
(2004) (“A democratic culture is democratic in the sense that everyone—not just political,
economic, or cultural elites—has a fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in
the development of the ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and
subcommunities to which they belong. . . . Freedom of expression protects the ability of
individuals to participate in the culture in which they live . . . .”).
239. Post, Reply, supra note 21, at 621.
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‘pornography,’ a spokesman for the Kitchen said, ‘Here it was
240
performed in an art context.’” These are arguments rooted in use,
not in representation.
Such examples raise the question of whether the use approach
provides any boundaries whatsoever between meaning and nonsense.
Indeed, if not applied rigorously, the fuzziness inherent in evaluating
language games and social practices can be made to shield nearly any
241
act or utterance. But although use meaning is potentially more
capacious with regard to meaning than the representational approach,
it is not all-encompassing. By establishing a new approach to
meaning, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy simply creates a
242
new and potentially richer approach to nonsense and language.
Rather than arising from a disjunction between language and
extralinguistic facts, speech is nonsensical when it fails to adhere to
the rules of the relevant language game. Professor Jonathan Yovel
explains that “one plays a language-game by the act of following its
rules; deviation from the rules is ‘not playing the game,’ which
243
produces nonsense in relation to the language-game in question.”
Identifying and evaluating meaning, then, requires focus on how
language is actually used.
In a variety of ways, the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed
this view, suggesting that the First Amendment has at least partially
taken its own linguistic turn with regard to meaning. This is a
welcome development both descriptively and normatively, for the
use-meaning approach better captures both the actual contours of
existing First Amendment coverage and the constitutional value of
what would otherwise seem to be meaningless speech.

240. Adler, supra note 10, at 1370.
241. Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 629, 648
(2000) (“[T]he Court seems to believe that every human act has ‘meaning,’ and thus may convey
a ‘message.’”). Tien goes on to discuss City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), in which the
Court concluded that social dancing is not speech, even though “some kernel of expression” can
be found in almost all human activity. Tien, supra, at 648–49 (quoting Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25).
242. See Tilghman, supra note 24, at 256 (“Wittgenstein went on to provide a still richer
exploration of nonsense in the Philosophical Investigations where he locates a craving for
nonsense in certain deep aspects of our language and our life. It is this craving that he believes is
responsible for much of traditional philosophy which, on his view, turns out to be grounded in
conceptual confusion and therefore a kind of nonsense.”).
243. Yovel, supra note 231, at 941; see also Bartrum, supra note 226, at 11 (“[A] word’s
meaning often does not derive from some foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is
determined by the use to which it is properly put within a particular language-game.”).
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The First Amendment’s linguistic turn manifests itself in many
areas of doctrine, perhaps most prominently in cases that tinker with
Spence’s representationalist machinery. In Hurley v. Irish-American
244
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., for example, the
Court assessed the constitutional salience of a Hibernian pride
parade. The Justices conceded that it was difficult to locate a “narrow,
245
succinctly articulable message” in the parade, but concluded that no
such showing was required. A unanimous Court held that the parade
qualified for protection, and that “if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [the First Amendment] would
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
246
Carroll.” This is effectively a rejection of the representational
approach and an endorsement of the idea that meaning lies in form
and use.
The distinction between the representational and use approaches
animates many other cases as well. Recall Morse v. Frederick. On a
strictly representational approach, the phrase “BONG HiTS 4
247
JESUS” seems just as nonsensical as Chomsky’s “[c]olorless green
248
ideas sleep furiously” —each idea might represent a concept, but
249
strung together they convey nothing sensible. (Conversely, if a
group of students displayed the latter on a banner, it might also
reasonably be viewed as promoting—or perhaps demonstrating—
illegal drug use!) Indeed, the student’s declaration that the banner
was designed to be nonsense, if accepted, should have taken him
outside the realm of Spence v. Washington, because no “intent to
250
convey a particularized message was present.”
To the
representationalist, then, the act involved only nonsense. If the First

244. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
245. Id. at 569.
246. Id. at 568–69 (citation omitted).
247. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
248. CHOMSKY, supra note 70, at 15.
249. See Bill Poser, The Supreme Court Fails Semantics, LANGUAGE LOG (July 7, 2007, 5:09
AM), http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004696.html (“[T]he Court has
invalidly inferred a particular proposition. The slogan is in fact meaningless in the sense that it
expresses no proposition, and Frederick gave a perfectly plausible explanation for the use of a
meaningless slogan. The Court was therefore wrong in finding that the banner advocates the use
of marijuana.”).
250. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
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Amendment requires the presence of meaning, then there was no
constitutional issue to begin with.
Under a use-meaning approach, by contrast, the fact that the
banner’s words conveyed no semantic content does not preclude
them from having meaning, which derives from use, not
representation. That use, the majority concluded, imbued them with
drug-promoting meaning, not simply television-attracting meaning. In
other words, the use-meaning approach can account for the existence
of meaning in the banner, therefore bringing the case within the
boundaries of the First Amendment and enabling the more
substantive and useful debate over whether the majority identified
the correct meaning, and whether the government had sufficient
252
reason to regulate it.
This is the same basic insight reflected in the First Amendment’s
attention to context as a component of meaning. The representational
approach is relatively, if not entirely, acontextual. Whether a word
“really” corresponds to an underlying concept is generally not
dependent on the context in which that word is deployed. But First
Amendment doctrine itself is deeply attuned to the fact that context
253
can create or change meaning. Even Spence recognized that
254
“context may give meaning to [a] symbol.” The Court there noted
that hanging a flag upside down with peace symbols attached to it

251. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
252. The meaning (or lack thereof) of the banner would of course be relevant to that
inquiry. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that nonsense should be free from government
regulation precisely because it lacks meaning. See Chevigny, supra note 95, at 164 (arguing that
under the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as nonsense, the “most appropriate argument for
freedom of speech would be that people ought to be allowed to say what they please, at least
about questions of norms and values, because what they say is meaningless,” and that “[t]he
government could have no reason to restrain debate that might continue endlessly without hope
of a fruitful result”); see also Catherine L. Amspacher & Randel Steven Springer, Note, Humor,
Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament for
Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 726 (1990) (“[E]xpressions . . . that
courts classify as ‘nonsense’ or ‘fantasy’ are protected from defamation suits because, by
definition, no one will believe them to be literally true.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 182
(describing the “rationality” challenge to regulations of art as “assert[ing] that the grounds for
such regulations are typically so weak that the artworks would be protected by a substantive due
process requirement that exercises of government power must be minimally rational”).
253. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601,
676 (1990) (“[T]he judgment that speech is being communicated in a ‘public’ manner ultimately
depends upon the particular context of a specific communicative act . . . .”).
254. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
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related to a “contemporaneous issue of intense public concern,” and
that observers were likely to recognize Spence’s point “at the time
256
that he made it,” even though in a different context it “might be
257
interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior.” A similar
principle seems to be on display (so to speak) in the Court’s nude
dancing cases, in which the Justices have taken pains to distinguish
between “bacchanalian revelries” in barrooms and “a performance by
258
a scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater.”
Further hints of the use-meaning approach can be found in the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage extends
to practices that form a “significant medium for the communication of
259
ideas,” even if the specific communication at issue does not
260
successfully convey a particularized message. Post has provided the
strongest normative justification for this approach, arguing that “First
Amendment coverage presumptively extends to media for the
communication of ideas, like newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or
cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts
261
that define and sustain the public sphere.” It follows that, “[i]n the
absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such
262
media is covered by the First Amendment.” On this approach,
“Jabberwocky” is covered by the First Amendment not because its
words represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a poem.
The same basic intuition might be animating the appealing but
problematic effort to draw a line between “pure speech” and
expressive conduct. The Supreme Court has suggested that pure
speech—apparently conceived as the spoken or written word, with no

255. Id. That context included “the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State
University, events which occurred a few days prior to [Spence’s] arrest.” Id. at 408.
256. Id. at 410.
257. Id.
258. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972); see Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech
and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1873 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s nudedancing cases establish the proposition that constitutional significance may be ascribed to the
context in which the dancing takes place.”).
259. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
260. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (holding that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection”).
261. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 20.
262. Id.
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263

accompanying nonverbal action —should receive complete
264
constitutional coverage, apparently without any further inquiry into
its meaningfulness. Expressive conduct, by contrast, is covered only
when it is sufficiently imbued with “communicative element[s]” as to
265
bring it within the boundaries of the Amendment. In other words, it
266
must, at least according to some accounts, convey ideas or meaning.
267
The pure speech/expressive conduct dichotomy is deeply difficult,
268
largely inaccurate, and probably unworkable. But the effort itself
demonstrates that meaning may lie in form and use, rather than in
269
representation.
C. Making the Most of the First Amendment’s Linguistic Turn
Endorsing use meaning as an alternative to representational
meaning is relatively easy; implementing it is not. It should by now be
apparent that the boundaries of the First Amendment cannot be
explained on the basis of the relationship between language and
extralinguistic facts, as the representational-meaning approach would
suggest. But to say that those boundaries do or should depend instead

263. See Susan Jill Rice, Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of
the Judicial Response to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 561, 563 (1988) (“Pure speech may be defined as expression in its pristine state,
completely isolated from activity.”); Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United
States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place
and Manner Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 471 (1992) (“Pure speech has been generally
defined as communicative expression in a pure state without physical activity.”).
264. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969)
(noting that wearing armbands is “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held,
is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”).
265. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
266. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 3, at 37 (“[S]ymbolic speech requires not merely that
given conduct results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must intend
such a meaning effect by his conduct.”).
267. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493–96 (1975) (arguing that
the burning of a draft card is “100% action and 100% expression”); see also Tushnet, supra note
9, at 192–99 (describing the “[a]ttractions and [p]erils of [n]ominalism,” the idea that “[t]he First
Amendment is about speech and the press—about words”).
268. Certain kinds of speech, including obscenity, are thought to fall outside the scope of the
First Amendment, even when they are pure speech. See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying
text.
269. See Post, supra note 42, at 1257 (“The very concept of a medium presupposes that
constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and disembodied acts of
communication of the kind envisioned by Spence, but is instead always conveyed through social
and material forms of interaction.”).
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on language games raises a new, albeit more useful, set of questions.
This final section explores a few of them.
First, by focusing on language games rather than on the
connection between words and ideas, the approach here would
exclude from First Amendment coverage acts that, despite being
“communicative” in some sense, are not traditionally recognized as
“speech.” This could explain why many prominent First Amendment
scholars have rejected a generalist account of the constitutional value
270
271
of form, focusing instead on the transmission of ideas.
This objection is difficult and deceptively complex, as is the best
answer to it: that such activities, whatever relationships they might
have with the First Amendment’s values, simply are not speech.
Consider Jed Rubenfeld’s example of a person who speeds to express
272
disapproval of speed limits,
or Tushnet’s example of ticket
273
scalping. These activities arguably further First Amendment values
by advancing the autonomy interests of those engaged in them, and
perhaps even communicate ideas. But so do innumerable other
activities, from terrorist attacks to rape. Prohibition of those activities
is perfectly constitutional under the First Amendment not because
the government interest in doing so is sufficiently strong, but because
they are not thought to implicate the First Amendment at all. To
borrow Schauer’s terminology, they are uncovered, not merely
274
unprotected.
270. See Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (1968) (“The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between
speech and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of
conduct. If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a
common comprehensible form of expression, it is ‘speech.’”); Melville B. Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180, 1189 (1970) (exploring the argument that the First Amendment protects ideas rather
than particular forms of expression).
271. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 34 (“It is the ideas expressed, and not just a particular
form of expression, that must be protected if the underlying first amendment values are to be
realized.”).
272. See Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 772 (“But suppose A says that his conduct was
expressive. Suppose he says that driving fast is how he ‘expresses himself.’ Or that he was
‘expressing disagreement’ with the federally mandated speed limit. Or that his speeding was
‘performance art.’”).
273. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 194 (explaining why “ticket scalping is outside the First
Amendment’s coverage”). But see id. (criticizing the argument that “a reasonably widespread
imputation of roughly the same meaning” can implicate First Amendment coverage).
274. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 267 (defining the question of “coverage” as “[w]hat marks
off the category covered by the first amendment from those other categories of conduct that do
not implicate free speech analysis”).
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The question of what constitutes “speech” is, in turn, an old one
for First Amendment theory and doctrine, and the difficulty of
articulating anything like a precise definition is familiar. This Article
has focused on one possible component of speech—meaning—not the
concept of speech as a whole. The two inquiries might be distinct;
perhaps meaning must be accompanied by a volitional act or
utterance to constitute speech. To the degree that the discussion here
provides lessons for the quest to define speech itself, it is that the
275
answers probably lie in social practices rather than in formal logic.
In the end, as Schauer explains, “the very idea of free speech is a
crude implement, to the core, protecting acts that its background
justifications would not protect, and failing to protect acts that its
276
background justifications would protect.”
But the crudeness of the implement raises another and perhaps
equally foundational challenge for the use-meaning approach:
negotiating the tension between the First Amendment’s desire for
clear boundaries and language games’ resistance to them. As to the
former, the importance of clarity in First Amendment doctrine is
277
recognized as valuable in its own right. Language games, however,
are a poor guide for establishing clear boundaries. Both in their
278
definition and in their behavior, language games “lack purity.” Post,
whose First Amendment theory depends on identifying those
boundaries, concludes that although we do not “have a very clear or
hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public discourse, “it is
anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are reflected in
279
constitutional doctrine.”
Ordinary-language philosophers, too,
embrace this as not merely a necessary drawback, but a positive
feature of their approach. As Toril Moi explains, “Often the blurred

275. This is the quest in which Post has long been engaged. See, e.g., Post, supra note 42, at
1250.
276. Schauer, supra note 98, at 13.
277. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (holding a statute void for
vagueness under a First Amendment analysis because of its chilling effect on protected speech);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (upholding a federal injunction against state
court prosecutions under vague state statutes, on the basis of the prosecutions’ “chilling” effect).
278. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 45, at 1802; see also Chevigny, supra note 95, at 167
(“Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ concept has been criticized for a lack of precision.”); Biletzki
& Matar, supra note 68 (noting that Wittgenstein “never explicitly defines” the concept of
language game).
279. Post, Reply, supra note 21, at 622–23.
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concept is exactly what we want . . . . In many cases . . . , it is useless to
280
spend time and energy trying to produce a sharp concept.”
The problem is not simply that language games have fuzzy
boundaries, but that it is difficult to know at what level of generality
they should be defined. After all, “use” can refer to an individual
speech act or to a broader category of speech acts bearing a family
281
resemblance; language games can involve two people, a group, or an
entire community. Ordinary-language philosophy typically takes the
former route, focusing on the meaning of particular speech acts. The
inevitable result is a kind of case-by-case analysis that requires careful
consideration of individual speech acts.
But whatever its merits as a philosophical approach to language,
the case-by-case approach does not necessarily make for good free
speech law. Case-by-case ex post analysis is ill-suited to provide the
kind of articulable ex ante rules that law—and especially First
282
Amendment doctrine—is generally thought to require.
First
Amendment language games must be defined with sufficient breadth
that individuals can tailor their conduct accordingly. A use-meaning
approach to the Amendment’s boundaries must therefore focus to
some degree on form and use, rather than act and use.
The cost of that breadth, however, is inaccuracy. The more
broadly a First Amendment language game is defined, the less likely
it is to capture the values that justify its protection, and the more
likely it is to be overinclusive with regard to speech. But that is a cost
283
that the First Amendment encourages us to pay. Defining speech at

280. Moi, supra note 237, at 814.
281. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 3.311, at 51 (“An expression presupposes the
forms of all propositions in which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of
propositions.”).
282. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court
has held that in such circumstances ‘more precision in drafting may be required because of the
vagueness doctrine in the case of regulation of expression,’ a ‘greater degree of specificity’ is
demanded than in other contexts.” (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756
(1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974))); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108–09 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . . [W]here a vague statute ‘abut[s]
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms.’” (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961))).
283. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 22 (“[T]he idea of free speech, as contrasted with the
justifications it is thought to serve, is itself an exercise in distrust, in suboptimality, and in the
recognition of the frequent virtues of second-best solutions.”).
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the level of form rather than that of individual speech acts may be
imperfect, but it does help check the government’s power to regulate
speech by defining its boundaries.
The malleability of the language game approach also suggests
ways to account for new social practices and language games—video
284
games, for example. Defining these as “speech” based on the ideas
they convey seems unsatisfying, to say the least. The answer seems to
lie instead with the fact that over time they have simply become
recognized as such. Admittedly, the power to make that
285
determination is itself a form of speech regulation. But such line
drawing is inevitably a part of First Amendment doctrine. Better that
the lines be drawn on the basis of such social practices than on the
basis of supposed relationships between words and concepts.
There are no straightforward and simple solutions to these
286
287
problems. First Amendment doctrine has proven slithy enough to
cover the Jabberwocky and other nonsensical speech, but perhaps the
288
Justices will see fit to gimble exceptions for other kinds of nonsense,
289
leaving even nonartists mimsy. First Amendment doctrine and the
language games on which it is based are messy and ongoing
290
projects—an experiment, “as all life is an experiment.” The
Amendment’s “linguistic turn” would yield no more clear answers
than the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. But it would, at the
very least, better capture what we mean by meaning, and why we
think it matters for the First Amendment.

284. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (striking down, on
First Amendment grounds, restrictions on sales of violent video games to minors); see also
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460. 482 (2010) (striking down restrictions on depictions of
animal cruelty).
285. See Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 1303, 1343 (2009) (“Whether through its political or its judicial branches,
governmental definition of the scope of public discourse is itself a regulation of public
discourse . . . .” (emphasis added)).
286. See Post, supra note 253, at 683 (“In the end . . . there can be no final account of the
boundaries of the domain of public discourse.”).
287. See LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 149 (Martin
Gardner ed., 2000) (defining “slythy” as a “compound[] of SLIMY and LITHE,” meaning
“[s]mooth and active”).
288. CARROLL, supra note 54, at 21; see CARROLL, supra note 287, at 149 (defining
“gymble” as “[t]o screw out holes”).
289. CARROLL, supra note 287, at 149 (defining “mimsy” as “MISERABLE” or “[u]nhappy”).
290. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
What is the doctrinal or “practical” significance of this inquiry?
At a basic level, the argument is simply that the First Amendment
should be—and to a large extent already is—interested in use
meaning, rather than representational meaning. It follows that some
“nonsense” is entitled to constitutional protection. This conclusion is
neither dependent on any conclusion about analytic philosophy, nor
does it require judges, lawyers, or scholars to be philosophers. And
yet the philosophical inquiries of the past century are so similar in
substance to those needed in the First Amendment context that the
former provide useful guidance for the latter.
This Article also indicates a different approach to establishing
whether nonrepresentational art—including instrumental music and
nonsensical poetry—should be entitled to constitutional protection.
The frequency with which scholars focus specifically on
nonrepresentational
art
suggests
that
they
believe
representationalism to be an essential part of defining the First
Amendment’s scope. The argument here suggests that it is not, and
that a more useful inquiry would focus on social understandings of art
in various contexts.
Relatedly, the search for meaning in social usages rather than in
representationalism could extend not just to whether a speech act is
meaningful, but also which of many possible meanings it should have.
This raises difficult questions when considered in light of the putative
speaker’s mental state. On the one hand, that seems perfectly
straightforward: surely “Fuck the Draft” had a particular meaning
291
precisely because of the broader social context in which it was used.
But if speech is fully defined by what a viewer (subjective or
objective) would understand, then even “innocent” speakers—
including those who intend no offense—might be found liable for
meanings they never meant to convey.
Finally, focusing on the social embeddedness of speech has
implications for the degree to which speakers can actually control the
meaning of their own speech—whether it has any at all, and, if so,
what meaning it has. The use-meaning approach described here
291. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409–10 (1974) (concluding that when the flag was hung from a window with a peace sign
taped to it, “the nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment in
which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that [Spence] engaged in a form of protected
expression”).
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would effectively deny constitutional coverage to putative speech acts
which, though perhaps meaningful to the speaker, do not respect the
292
rules of our shared language games. Our old friend Lewis Carroll
provides the perfect illustration:
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for
you!”
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—
till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for
you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice
objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be
293
master—that’s all.”

Humpty Dumpty is violating the rules of a language game, and thus
speaking nonsense, but the question he identifies is essentially the
same one asked by analytic philosophers. The use-meaning approach
denies that the speaker is inevitably master of meaning, which has a
variety of potentially troubling implications—consider again the
student in Morse, who claimed to be speaking nonsense—that deserve
further exploration.
Given that Ludwig Wittgenstein has served as a guide and
occasional stalking horse throughout this Article, it seems
appropriate to conclude where the Tractatus does. The seventh and
final section famously reads, in full: “Whereof one cannot speak,
294
thereof one must be silent.” If the boundaries of the First
Amendment depend on the presence of representational meaning,

292. Cf. 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
234 (1985) (“Men speak together, to each other. Language is fashioned and grows not
principally in monologue, but in dialogue, or better, in the life of the speech community.”);
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 243 (arguing that a private language—one whose “individual
words . . . are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate
private sensations”—cannot have meaning).
293. CARROLL, supra note 54, at 123–24.
294. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 7, at 189.
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then Congress could codify Wittgenstein’s admonition without
violating the Constitution, because saying what cannot be said is, by
definition, nonsense. This Article has argued that this cannot be the
case, and that the meaning of speech lies not in its connection to
extralinguistic facts, but in its use. This road is bumpier, but its
imperfection offers better footing than the smooth alternatives. “Back
295
to the rough ground!”

295. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 107 (“We have got on to slippery ice where there
is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we
are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!”).

